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Introduction
In July 2000, Boulder, Colorado, became the first city to replace the term
“pet owner” with “guardian” in its municipal code.1 Two California cities, West
Hollywood and Berkeley, soon did likewise,2 and in 2001 Rhode Island became
the first state to reference pet owners as “guardians.”3 Currently nineteen
jurisdictions—the state of Rhode Island, one Canadian city, and seventeen U.S.
cities—use this language.4 Inspired by a campaign by the animal rights group, In
Defense of Animals, the language change to animal “guardian” is aimed at
promoting more responsible pet ownership by changing the words people use
about their animals.5
Notwithstanding these laudable goals, a great deal of opposition has been
mounted against legislation that changes the language describing the
relationship between people and their animals from “owner” to “guardian.”
Groups ranging from veterinary associations6 to breed-specific dog clubs,7 the
Cat Fanciers Association,8 and professional aviculturalists9 have opposed such
language, claiming that such changes threaten to undermine, rather than
strengthen, the relationship between people and their pets.10 One of the primary
arguments focuses on the claim that pet “guardians” might be faced with more
limited health care choices for their pets, and that veterinarians might have
1

R. Scott Nolen, Owners or Guardians? Cities Change Identity of Pet Owners, Hoping to
Promote
Welfare,
J.
AM.
VETERINARY
MED .
ASS’N
NEWS,
Apr.
15,
2001,
http://www.avma.org/onlnews/javma/apr01/s041501b.asp; BOULDER, COLO., CODE § 6-1-2
(2005) (“‘Guardian’ means owner.”).
2
Nolen, supra note 1; WEST HOLLYWOOD, CAL., CODE tit. 9, art. 4 (2008), available at
http://qcode.us/codes/westhollywood/ (also using the term “custodian”); BERKELEY, CAL.,
MUN. CODE § 10.04.010(F) (2007) (“Owner/guardian”).
3
Nolen, supra note 1; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 4-1-1(a)(4) (Supp. 2006).
4
The
Guardian
Campaign,
Do
You
Live
in
a
Guardian
Community?,
http://guardiancampaign.org/guardiancity.html (last visited June 14, 2009) (listing the 20 cities
or counties and the state of Rhode Island that include guardianship language in their laws).
5
Nolen, supra note 1.
6
See, e.g., Pennsylvania Veterinary Medical Ass’n, Position Statement on Owner vs.
Guardian (Mar. 9, 2005), http://www.pavma.org/displaycommon.cfm?an=1&subarticlenbr=61.
7
See, e.g., American Rottweiler Club, Anti-Canine Legislation Information,
http://www.amrottclub.org/bsl/bslmain.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2009); Weimaraner Club of
America, Legislative News, http://www.erbenhof.com/wcalegislation.html (last visited Mar. 10,
2009) (reprinting an article entitled Ownership versus Guardianship by Rottweiler Society member
Jan Cooper); see also American Kennel Club (AKC), Canine Legislation Position Statements 12
(2005), http://www.akc.org/pdfs/canine_legislation/pbleg2full.pdf (“‘Guardian’ v. Owner”).
8
Cat Fanciers’ Association, CFA’s Perspective on the Guardian Issue,
http://www.cfa.org/articles/legislative/guardian-perspective.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
9
Genny Wall, Using the Legal Term “Guardian” Rather than “Owner”: Is This Necessary, or
Even
a
Good
Idea?,
AFA
WATCHBIRD
(2002),
available
at
http://www.proaviculture.com/guardian.htm.
10
See, e.g., Pennsylvania Veterinary Medical Ass’n, supra note 6.

2

Hankin
(2009)

Stanford Journal of Animal Law & Policy | Vol. 2

trouble clarifying who should be making the choices regarding an animal’s
care.11
Choices about veterinary care for companion animals may matter now
more than they ever have in the past. Despite their designation as personal
property—even under statutes that have replaced “owners” with
“guardians”12—companion animals are increasingly considered members of their
human families.13 And when these family members become ill, an increasingly
sophisticated range of treatment choices are available for them—in fact, many of
the same treatment choices that are available in human medicine.14 Treatment
options for animals have expanded to such an extent that many veterinarians can
no longer be considered general practitioners; rather, they specialize in areas
such as veterinary oncology, neurology, dermatology, critical care, and sports
medicine.15
This Article explores whether legislating a language change from “owner”
to “guardian” has any real impact on the way we make health care decisions for
our animal companions. Opponents of such changes seem to fear the
implications of importing a term into human-animal relationships that already
carries a legally significant meaning in relationships between people.16 Being
appointed the guardian of a person carries with it certain rights and
responsibilities, including those involving health care decisions.17 Whether using
the term “guardian” to describe humans’ relationship to companion animals
affects our ability to make veterinary care choices for those animals will be
explored as a way of addressing this central question: As companion animals are
treated more like family, and as veterinary medicine is offering more and more
11

See AVMA Opposes ‘Pet Guardianship’: No Evidence ‘Guardianship’ Enhances Relationship
Between
Owner
and
Pet,
JAVMA
NEWS,
July
1,
2003,
http://www.avma.org/onlnews/javma/jul03/030701i.asp.
12
See, e.g., SAN JOSE, CAL., MUN. CODE § 7.10.125 (2007) (“‘Guardian’ as used in this title
means an owner of an animal with the same duties and obligations under this title as an
owner.”).
13
See Susan J. Hankin, Not a Living Room Sofa: Changing the Legal Status of Companion
Animals, 4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 314, 352 (2007).
14
See Mary Margaret McEachern Nunalee & G. Robert Weedon, Modern Trends in Veterinary
Malpractice: How Our Evolving Attitudes Toward Non-Human Animals Will Change Veterinary
Medicine, 10 ANIMAL L. 125, 139-40 (2004) (discussing pet owners’ desires to pursue sophisticated
treatment and high-tech diagnostic tools for their pets).
15
See, e.g., University of Pennsylvania Veterinary Medicine, Faculty and Departments,
http://www.vet.upenn.edu/FacultyandDepartments.aspx (last visited Mar. 10, 2009) (listing
departments and sections within the school of veterinary medicine); American Veterinary
Medical
Association,
Market
Research
Statistics:
Veterinary
Specialists—2008,
http://www.avma.org/reference/marketstats/vetspec.asp (last visited Mar. 10, 2009) (listing
twenty veterinary specialty organizations).
16
See, e.g., Pennsylvania Veterinary Medical Ass’n, supra note 6 (“Guardian is a welldefined legal term that is not appropriate in describing the relationship between owners and their
animals.”).
17
See, e.g., UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP AND PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT, 8A U.L.A. §§ 207, 208,
313, 314 (1997) (duties and powers of guardians of minors and incapacitated persons).
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high-tech solutions to treat animals, to what extent can and should the legal
framework for clinical decision-making in human medicine be imported into
veterinary medicine to control owners’ treatment choices?
Part I of this Article addresses the arguments that have been mounted
against the campaign to change pet “owners” into pet “guardians,” particularly
those arguments that center around making choices regarding an animal’s
medical care. This part will set out the background surrounding the passage of
the owner-to-guardian laws and the reasons that they were enacted. It will next
address the various arguments against using the term “guardian” for animals
and respond to those arguments, concluding that it is unlikely that such a change
will lead to more limited health care choices for pets. By exploring the legal
implications of the term “guardian,” as it is used in medical-care decisionmaking, the discussion will show that the term has many different meanings and
that limitations on guardian decision-making are built into statute-specific
definitions of guardians’ powers and duties. No such limitations exist in the
animal law statutes. This Part concludes that while some anti-guardian
arguments are quite far-fetched, enough others have merit that these arguments
need to be taken seriously. Given that using the term “guardian” in the animal
context could create some potential for confusion, and given the general
resistance to these initiatives, it may be best to come up with alternative models
for health care decision-making for companion animals.
Part II of this Article looks at medical care decision-making in human
medicine as a background for exploring these questions in veterinary medicine.
While the predominant model in human health care decision-making is based on
principles of autonomy and informed consent, these concepts are not useful in
discussing decisions for animals’ care. Instead the focus will be on health care
decision-making for those who lack competence to make their own decisions,
including formerly competent adults who have become incapacitated, disabled
adults who have never had the capacity to make health care decisions, and
young children who lack competence to make their own medical decisions. This
Part will discuss the substituted judgment and best interest decision-making
standards, and will conclude that the best interest standard may have some
applicability in the animal law context.
Part III looks more generally at the extent to which the legal framework for
clinical decision-making in human medicine can be imported into veterinary
medicine and through what mechanisms. As part of this discussion, the Article
will address the major similarities as well as major differences between human
health care and veterinary medicine. After addressing these similarities and
differences, this Part will explore the following questions around veterinary
clinical decision-making: Who should decide what level of care an animal
receives? What factors should be included in these decisions? To what extent
should economic considerations be taken into account in making such decisions?
And, finally, should there be any limits on complete owner discretion? The
Article concludes by arguing that while the current process is working for most
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animal care decisions, there are some extreme cases where owner choices should
be checked. The best way of setting these limits is not, however, through statutes
changing language from “owner” to “guardian,” but rather by strengthening and
clarifying language requiring proper veterinary care in existing animal cruelty
statutes.

I.

From “Property Owner” to “Guardian”

In the past seven years, one state, one Canadian city, and seventeen U.S.
cities have enacted laws that change the language describing the relationship
between people and their animals from “owner” to “guardian.”18 While Rhode
Island is the only state to have made such a change to its animal protection laws,
as of this writing, at least eighteen cities or towns—including Boulder, Colorado;
Berkeley, West Hollywood, and San Francisco, California; St. Louis, Missouri;
and Woodstock, New York—have enacted similar language changes.19 These
legal changes have followed an initiative by the California-based In Defense of
Animals (IDA), whose Guardian Campaign seeks to “reflect growing public
support for a redefined public standard of relating to animals.”20
A.

Goals of the Owner-to-Guardian Campaign

IDA’s campaign sets forth a number of goals that it seeks to achieve by
changing the language we use to refer to non-human animals. It hopes to
reinforce our society’s changing view of animals and to increase the recognition
that animals are individual beings “with needs and interests of their own,” rather
than objects for our use.21 By encouraging the use of different language to effect
these changes in attitude,22 the campaign hopes to meet a number of practical
goals, which include reducing the amount of animal abuse and abandonment,
18

See, e.g., R.I. GEN LAWS § 4-1-1(a)(4) (Supp. 2006); BOULDER, COLO., CODE § 6-1-2 (2008);
see also The Guardian Campaign, supra note 4; National Ass’n for Biomedical Research, Animal
Law Section, Ownership v. Guardianship, http://www.nabrlaw.org/Personhood/Ownershipv
Guardianship/tabid/634/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
19
See The Guardian Campaign, supra note 4.
20
The
Guardian
Campaign,
Respecting
Our
Animal
Friends,
http://guardiancampaign.org/campaign.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
21
The
Guardian
Campaign,
What
a
Difference
a
Word
Makes!,
http://guardiancampaign.org/whatdifferenceword.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2009) (“Recognize
Animals as Individuals, Not Objects . . . . Recognize Changing Public Attitudes Toward
Animals.”).
22
See Steven Best, Animal Guardianship: Speech for National Homeless Animals Day (Aug.
17, 2002), available at http://www.drstevebest.org/Essays/AnimalGuardianship.htm (“The
language we use to map the world is extremely important, it shapes and constrains our thinking;
if we define the natural world as a machine, we will treat it as an inert assemblage of parts alien
to our being. Similarly, if we define animals as property, we tend to regard them as lifeless
things, mere commodities, or disposable objects.”).
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lessening “puppy mill” breeding23 by discouraging purchase of animals in pet
stores, and lowering the population of animals in shelters.24
The jurisdictions that have enacted laws changing or supplementing
“owner” with “guardian” have cited a number of related reasons for the change,
suggesting that, for instance, this symbolic language change will educate the
public and encourage people to think of and treat their pets more like family and
household members and less like disposable property.25 Pet “guardians” will be
less inclined to mistreat their animals, less likely to leave them tied up outside,
and less likely to abandon them or leave them at shelters.26 Others hope that the
change might even encourage more people to adopt27 pets from shelters28 and
will have a positive impact on children, who will grow up with a stronger regard
for animals and be less likely to abuse them.29 Advocates also hope that this
language change will lead to a strengthening of animal cruelty laws and better
enforcement of current laws.30
A recently proposed bill in the District of Columbia is clearly aimed at a
number of these goals. In addition to amending the animal cruelty law so that
references to animal owners will include guardians, the Animal Protection
Amendment Act of 2008 is a comprehensive bill that also increases penalties for
animal cruelty, animal abandonment, and animal fighting, including for those
who are only spectators of fighting.31 Further, individuals convicted of any of
these offenses could lose their right to possess animals, and the court would have
the option of ordering counseling, treatment, or community service for anyone
convicted of these felony offenses. Finally, the proposed amendment includes
“reporting requirements for known or reasonably suspected animal cruelty,

23

“Puppy mill” has been defined as “a large scale substandard breeding operation which
typically produces animals by the hundreds with minimal regard for the health and welfare of
the animals.” Patti Bednarik, The Evolving Field of Animal Law, 77 PA . B. ASS’N Q. 88, 89 (2006).
24
See The Guardian Campaign, supra note 21; see also The Guardian Campaign, The
Guardian Promise, http://guardiancampaign.org/promise.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
25
Barbara Williams, Pet ‘Guardian’ Law a First in N.J.: To Foster Responsibility, Term ‘Owner’ Is
Changed, RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), May 13, 2004, at L1.
26
See Debra J. Saunders, Editorial, Going to the Dogs, S. F. CHRON., Jan. 19, 2003, at D4
(setting out the reasoning, while at the same time poking fun at the city’s ordinance); see also Greg
Avery, Council Adopts “Guardian” Title: Boulder Pet Owners Now Guardians Following Code Change,
BOULDER DAILY CAMERA, July 12, 2000, at 1C (“‘The animals in Boulder really need this help in
the change in language,’ said Boulder resident Cathy Comstock, adding that the number one
reason pets are left at the animal shelter is because people leave town. ‘That’s just not
acceptable.’”).
27
Using the term “adopt” in relation to animals is meant to have a similar effect on
attitudes toward pets.
28
Torri Minton, S.F. Pet Guardian Plan Goes to Supervisors, S. F. CHRON., Dec. 10, 1999, at
A31.
29
See Williams, supra note 25.
30
See id.
31
Animal Protection Amendment Act of 2008, Bill 17-89, 17th D.C. Council (D.C. 2008),
available at http://www.dccouncil.washington.dc.us/images/00001/20080710110513.pdf.
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abandonment, or neglect.”32 Unlike a number of other animal guardian laws, this
bill couples the language change with several other significant changes that
strengthen D.C.’s animal cruelty laws.
The symbolic language change alone is not intended to have a legal
impact,33 and the drafters of these legislative initiatives have therefore taken care
to define and limit the meaning of “guardian” in the companion animal context.
In many of the laws, such as Rhode Island’s state law on animal cruelty, the
word “guardian” actually supplements, rather than replaces, the term “owner.”34
Furthermore, as the statute’s definition section makes clear, this language change
does not alter in any way a person’s legal obligations to her animals:
“Guardian” shall mean a person(s) having the same rights and
responsibilities of an owner, and both terms shall be used
interchangeably. A guardian shall also mean a person who
possesses, has title to or an interest in, harbors or has control,
custody or possession of an animal and who is responsible for an
animal’s safety and well-being.35
Boulder, Colorado’s law is even more direct: its definition section clearly states,
“‘Guardian’ means owner.”36 In addition, the statute’s legislative intent section
clarifies that “[n]otwithstanding the use of words such as ‘guardian,’ . . . the city
council intends to reflect the common law view that the property rights of owners
in their animals are qualified by the city’s exercise of its police power over such
animals . . . .”37 Other statutes have limited the legal effect of such language
changes by opting for the term “owner/guardian” rather than simply
“guardian.”38
While the language change, by itself, is merely symbolic, this symbolism is
an important step toward recognizing that companion animals are fundamentally
different from inanimate property. Although still within the “property” construct,
the legal status of companion animals has been incrementally changing in recent
years in ways that increasingly recognize the value of companion animals.39
Along with these incremental legal changes, the difference between the sentient
32

See id.
See, e.g., Avery, supra note 26.
34
See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 4-1-1(a)(4), § 4-13-1.2(10), § 4-13.1-2(7), § 4-19-2(28) (Supp. 2006)
(adding the definition of “guardian” but not removing “owner keeper”).
35
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 4-1-1(a)(4) (Supp. 2006).
36
See
BOULDER,
COLO.,
CODE
§
6-1-2
(2008),
available
at
http://www.colocode.com/boulder2/chapter6-1.htm (last visited July 14, 2008) (“‘Guardian’
means owner”); see also S.F., CAL., HEALTH CODE art. I, § 41(m) (2008) (allowing “guardian” and
“owner” to be used interchangeably in the Code).
37
See BOULDER, COLO., CODE § 6-1-1(c) (2008) (emphasis added).
38
See,
e.g.,
BERKELEY,
CAL.,
CODE
§
10.04.010
(2007),
available
at
http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/bmc/berkeley_municipal_code/title_10/04/010.html
(defining
“Owner/guardian”).
39
See generally Hankin, supra note 13.
33
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animals with which we choose to share our lives and, say, the objects that we use
to furnish our homes needs to be reflected in the language we use. An important
way to accomplish this goal is to replace the term “owner” in describing our
relationship with our companion animals.
B.

Opposition to Language Changes

Despite the laudable goals of these changes and the lack of any real legal
effect, the “owner to guardian” laws have generated a good deal of
controversy, and a number of campaigns have emerged in opposition to
additional changes. Groups that oppose such language changes, including a
number of veterinary groups, claim that such changes threaten to undermine,
rather than strengthen, the relationship between people and their pets.41 They
claim, for example, that pet “guardians” might be faced with more limited health
care choices for their pets, and that veterinarians might have trouble clarifying
who should be making the choices regarding an animal’s care.42 Codifying this
opposition, the American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA)—the
veterinary equivalent of the AMA—has adopted an official position statement
against such terminology changes. Approved by their executive board in May
2003, their resolution reads as follows:
40

Ownership vs. Guardianship
The American Veterinary Medical Association promotes the
optimal health and well-being of animals. Further, the AVMA
recognizes the role of responsible owners in providing for their
animals’ care. Any change in terminology describing the
relationship between animals and owners does not strengthen this
relationship and may, in fact, diminish it. Such changes in

40

But see NABR, supra note 18 (“While this campaign is marketed as a feel-good exercise,
this ‘simple’ change in language elevates animals above their current status as property—with
potentially enormous legal implications.”).
41
See AVMA Opposes ‘Pet Guardianship’, supra note 11. Pressure from groups such as the
AVMA was presumably behind a resolution recently adopted by the Council of State
Governments (CSG) Governing Boards, which sets out its opposition to “legislation that
reclassifies pet, livestock or animal owners as guardians or that otherwise alters the legal status of
animals.” Council of State Governments, Policy Resolutions: Animal Guardianship and Liability
Legislation, Fall 2004, http://www.csg.org/policy/resolutions.aspx. The reasons the CSG gives
for its resolution include a claim that such statutes would limit owners’ freedom of choice in
caring for their animals, permit third parties to petition for a pet’s custody, permit a legal
challenge to treatment choices of owners and veterinarians, and generally threaten the legal
balance between the rights of pet owners and the well-being of animals. This resolution was
adopted in September of 2004. See id. Given its adoption, it is unlikely that many states will be
following Rhode Island’s lead in supplementing or changing the language of animal “owner” to
that of animal “guardian.”
42
See AVMA Opposes ‘Pet Guardianship’, supra note 11.
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terminology may decrease the ability of veterinarians to provide
services and, ultimately, result in animal suffering.43
The AVMA’s claims are fairly representative of many of the concerns that
have been raised in opposing the use of “guardian” in reference to relationships
with animals. At first blush, one might expect veterinarians who treat companion
animals to embrace such language. The concerns regarding the use of the term
“guardian” for pet owners appear to center around fears of where such language
could lead. It is this fear that has generated opposition from groups of
veterinarians, researchers, and state legislators against the “potentially enormous
legal implications”44 of what many proponents see as a simple language change
to help better educate the public about responsibilities toward pets. Proponents
want to see more responsible pet ownership, while opponents seem to fear the
implications of moving toward personhood status for pets. As one commentator
not so subtly put it, “guardian statutes are proverbial Trojan horses, opening the
door for more animal rights legislation to follow.”45
Still, it seems curious that so much organized opposition has emerged
against a change in language that has no current legal effect. The problem seems
to lie in the potential legal implications of a term—guardian—that already carries
a legally significant meaning, when used in reference to pets.46 And while many
of the concerns about importing the term guardian into relationships with
animals are understandable, if misplaced, some of the arguments that have been
raised in favor of the status quo often rely on scenarios that range from the
unlikely to the extreme.
C.

Responses to Arguments Against Animal Guardianship

Most of the arguments against the use of animal guardian language are
premised on this common theme: unintended consequences will occur because
courts will confuse the intended meaning of “guardian” in the animal context
with its legal meaning in other contexts.47 A number of these arguments center
43

Id.
NABR, supra note 18.
45
Gerald L. Eichinger, Veterinary Medicine: External Pressures on an Insular Profession and
How Those Pressures Threaten to Change Current Malpractice Jurisprudence, 67 MONT. L. REV. 231, 257
(2006).
46
See, e.g., Pennsylvania Veterinary Medical Ass’n, supra note 6 (opposing the change to
guardian language because “[g]uardian is a well-defined legal term that is not appropriate in
describing the relationship between owners and their animals”). The concern appears to stem
from a perception that using the term guardian for owner will change not only the
responsibilities of the owner-guardian, but also turn the animal into a human ward with human
rights.
47
See, e.g., American Veterinary Medical Law Ass’n, Ownership of Animals vs. Guardianship
of Animals: The Effect of a Change in the Law on Veterinarians in California, CAL. VETERINARIAN,
May/June 2002, at 10, available at http://www.ncraoa.com/articles/AR/AVMLAWhitePaper.pdf
[hereinafter AVMLA, White Paper].
44
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on the claim that animal “guardians” will have less say in the health care choices
for their pets. Such arguments rely on the role of guardians in human
relationships,48 including their fiduciary relationships to their wards and their
corresponding obligation to act in the wards’ best interests.49 And some of the
opponents of these laws go quite far to make their points. Thus the Dog
Federation of Wisconsin (which sets out its mission as “Promoting and
Protecting Responsible Dog Ownership”50) puts forth the following scare scenes
to encourage its members to oppose guardian laws:
Imagine wanting to neuter your six month old puppy, but your
neighbor thinks it’s bad for the dog so takes you to court to petition
for guardianship.
Imagine that your cousin thinks you should put your dog on life
support, even though it’s abundantly clear that at age 14, your
dog’s quality of life has greatly diminished.51
An issue paper prepared by the Animal Health Institute (AHI) takes this latter
unlikely scenario even further, claiming that if pet owners become pet guardians,
“[i]t could be illegal to spay or neuter a pet because it deprives them of their
‘reproductive rights.’”52 The same document also makes the following claim:
“[T]he term ‘guardian’ shares the decision-making rights and responsibilities
with courts and other third-parties who might be able to claim—under new
laws—an interest on the animal’s behalf.”53
Refuting some of these more far-fetched claims is not difficult. Given the
strong public policy54—and in some cases, laws55—in favor of spaying and
48

See, e.g., id. at 10-11 (raising the question of how courts would treat animal guardians by
citing a probate case that resolved a dispute between legatees, one of whom had been named
guardian of the decedent, her aunt).
49
See generally UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP AND PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT, 8A U.L.A. § 314
(1997) (delineating the fiduciary relationship between guardian and ward); see also infra notes 7078 and accompanying text.
50
Dog Federation of Wisconsin, http://www.dfow.org (last visited July 14, 2008).
51
Dog Federation of Wisconsin, Legislation Issues, http://www.dfow.org/legis.htm (last
visited July 14, 2008).
52
Animal Health Institute, Pet Owner or Guardian? (Nov. 2005), available at
http://www.avma.org/advocacy/state/issues/owner_guardian_ahi.asp.
53
Id.
54
See
Spay
USA,
Benefits
of
Spay/Neuter
for
Cats
and
Dogs,
http://www.spayusa.org/main_directory/02-facts_and_education/benefits_sn.asp (last visited
July 15, 2008); Humane Society of the United States, Why You Should Spay or Neuter Your Pet (Feb.
19,
2008),
http://www.hsus.org/pets/pet_care/why_you_should_spay_or_neuter_your_
pet.html.
55
See, e.g., SANTA CLARA CITY CODE § 6.30.020 (2008) (limiting households to “one
unspayed female” dog or cat); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 3939-A (Supp. 2007) (requiring
shelters to either spay or neuter an animal before placement with a new owner, or make an
appointment with a veterinarian to spay or neuter the animal within thirty days of adoption; in
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neutering companion animals, it is hard to imagine that someone trying to
oppose a neuter procedure through a guardianship petition would be given any
credence, let alone that such an action might be illegal. In fact, Santa Clara,
California, one of the few jurisdictions with a mandatory spay-neuter law, also
has a law promoting guardianship language,56 and no such conflict seems to
have arisen there. It is similarly hard to imagine an outsider being able to
question an animal guardian’s decision not to put a fourteen-year-old dog (or
any dog, for that matter) on life support. As for the AHI’s claim that animal
guardians would share decision-making rights with courts and other third
parties, the many differences between human medicine and veterinary medical
decision-making, which will be addressed in Part III, would seem to mitigate
against this claim. One important point worth noting here is that the basis for
challenging human medical care decision-making by guardians is often the
state’s parens patriae power57 to protect children and incompetent persons.58 No
such state power exists for non-human animals. Indeed, the state’s power often
works in just the opposite fashion: under their police power, states and cities can
destroy animals to protect the public.59 And this very point is noted in the
legislative intent section of the city of Boulder, Colorado’s law on animal
guardians.60
the latter case, the new owner must make a deposit with the shelter equal to 100% of the cost of
the surgery and sign a neuter/spay agreement); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 4-24-3 (Supp. 2006) (requiring
owners of cats to either spay or neuter their animal or pay an annual “intact animal fee”; no such
law for dogs); A.B. 1634, 2007-2008 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008) (bill that would mandate spaying or
neutering of dogs that have been impounded three times).
56
Indeed, both laws have the same purpose: to make pet owners more responsible. See
SANTA CLARA CITY CODE § 6.30.020 (2008) (mandatory spay and neuter); SANTA CLARA COUNTY,
CAL.,
ORDINANCE
NS-300.745
(Apr.
10,
2006),
available
at
http://www.sccgov.org/SCC/docs/SCC
Public
Portal/keyboard
agenda/BOS
Agenda/2006/April
25,
2006/TMPKeyboard201481938.pdf)
(changing
“owner”
to
“owner/guardian”).
57
See BLACK’S LAW D ICTIONARY 1144 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “parens patriae” as “the state
in its capacity as provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves” and as “[a]
doctrine by which a government has standing to prosecute a lawsuit on behalf of a citizen, esp.
on behalf of someone who is under a legal disability to prosecute the suit”).
58
See Jennifer L. Hartsell, Comment, Mother May I . . . Live? Parental Refusal of Life-Sustaining
Medical Treatment for Children Based on Religious Objections, 66 TENN. L. REV. 499, 516-17 (1999).
59
Animals can be destroyed by government mandate because they are dangerous, see, e.g.,
CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 31108.5(b) (West 2001) (vicious or dangerous dog); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-21-124(d)(3) (West 2005) (vicious or dangerous dog); N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW §
121(3) (McKinney Supp. 2008) (dangerous dogs); or because they may be infected with disease,
see, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 122210(c) (West 2006) (dogs with “disease, illness, or
congenital condition”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 25-618(1)(b) (2000) (diseased bison); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 47-1008(b) (Supp. 2006) (livestock considered “unfit for human consumption”).
60
See BOULDER, COLO., CODE § 6-1-1(c) (2008) (“Notwithstanding the use of words such as
“guardian,” “keeper,” “owner” or “title” in this chapter, the city council intends to reflect the
common law view that the property rights of owners in their animals are qualified by the city’s
exercise of its police power over such animals, and that summary impoundments and
dispositions of animals are two such qualifications of such rights.”).
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Other arguments against animal guardian laws challenge these laws by
raising concerns that seem extremely unlikely to apply in this context. For
example, the American Veterinary Medical Law Association (AVMLA), whose
2002 White Paper raises numerous legal concerns that could arise for veterinarians
if their clients become guardians rather than owners of animals,61 makes the
following claim: if guardianship law were applied to animal “guardians,” then
they would be required “to manage and control the estate of the animal and in so
doing will be required to use ordinary care and diligence.”62 This discussion goes
much further in outlining the purported duties that would be required of animal
guardians, including requirements of disclosing financial interests in business
entities.63 Positing such an application of California’s probate code to animals is
puzzling. It is not clear if the argument is meant to conflate the roles of guardian
of the person and guardian of the estate, but such an argument seems to be a
non-starter. Animal guardians could not be required to manage the estate of
animals where the statutes make clear that animals’ status as property remains
unchanged. As property, animals cannot have an estate.64
The AVMLA white paper raises another puzzling argument. In a section
addressing legal issues that might arise for veterinarians if their clients become
guardians of animals, it poses the following scenario: “If animal owners become
guardians . . . , can a veterinarian decline, indeed even be required to refuse, to
return an animal to a guardian . . . whom he or she suspects might be abusing the
animal?”65 There are several responses to this question. The immediate one that
comes to this author’s mind is that it is hard to imagine that a veterinarian would
not at least want the option of declining to return an animal to someone she
suspects is abusing that animal, whether that person is called an owner or a
guardian. If guardian language did in fact change the law in this way, wouldn’t
this be a good change? The sentiment would certainly be consistent with a
number of recent changes that have strengthened animal cruelty laws by
allowing courts to order that animal abusers forfeit their animals and their right
to own animals in the future;66 similar laws have mandated the reporting of
animal abuse.67
61

See AVMLA, White Paper, supra note 47, at 11-14.
Id. at 11 (citing CAL. PROBATE CODE § 2401).
63
Id.
64
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 586 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “estate” as “[t]he amount,
degree, nature, and quality of a person’s interest in land or other property . . . .”) (emphasis
added).
65
AVMLA, White Paper, supra note 47, at 13.
66
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.140(f)(3) (2006) (after conviction of misdemeanor animal
cruelty, court may “prohibit or limit the defendant’s ownership, possession, or custody of
animals for up to 10 years”); D EL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1325(d) (2007) (after conviction of felony
animal cruelty, cannot own animals for fifteen years, except animals “raised . . . within the State
for resale”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1031(3-B)(B) (Supp. 2007) (if convicted, court may
permanently prohibit animal ownership or having animals on the premises).
67
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-2239 (2008) (veterinarian shall report suspected
animal fighting or animal abuse); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-64-121(1) (West Supp. 2007) (requiring
62
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Other arguments against animal guardians focus more directly on the
ramifications for making health-care decisions for pets. Opponents claim that
animal guardians will have more limited treatment choices than animal owners68
and that the legal duties of veterinarians will be less clear.69 Many of these
arguments depend on the “best interest” standard from the law of guardianship
for persons70 being applied in the veterinary context. Opponents of animal
guardianship raise issues such as whether a “best interest” standard will mean
that owners will be more limited in choosing euthanasia for their animals,71 how
veterinarians should determine the best interests of an animal if the owner wants
it euthanized,72 and whether animal care and control groups will have to change
their policies on euthanasia.73
Another set of veterinary-care related arguments looks at the interplay
between treatment options and the financial resources of the owner or guardian.
These discussions pose questions about what happens when a “guardian” cannot
afford treatment that is in the animal’s best interest74 and posit that such
requirements might lead to increased abandonment of animals.75 A best interest
standard, it is argued, will require owners to pay for treatment they cannot
afford,76 and questions therefore arise about who will be responsible for

veterinarian to report suspected animal cruelty or animal fighting); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
115/25 (1)(GG) (LexisNexis 2007) (disciplinary sanction for veterinarian who fails to report
suspected cruelty or torture of animal); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 346.37(6) (West 2004) (requiring
veterinarian to report “known or suspected cases of abuse, cruelty, or neglect to peace officers
and humane agents”); see also, e.g., Animal Protection Amendment Act of 2008, 55 D.C. Reg. 9186
(Dec. 5, 2008); A.B. 2668, 213th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2008).
68
See Animal Health Institute, supra note 52.
69
See AVMA Task Force on Legal Status of Animals, Ownership Versus Guardianship (June
2005), http://www.avma.org/advocacy/state/issues/ownership.asp.
70
See infra notes 144-147 and accompanying text.
71
See AVMA Task Force, supra note 69.
72
See AVMLA, White Paper, supra note 47, at 13 (“If the guardian standard of ‘best interest
of the animal’ is to be the standard in determining the level of veterinary treatment or care to be
provided to an animal, what objective criteria is [sic] to be used in determining what is in the
‘best interest of the animal?’ For example, if a guardian asks a veterinarian to euthanize a dog
claiming it is sick, but the veterinarian knows the guardian just does not want the dog anymore,
even if the dog is old, but certainly not dying, can the veterinarian legally euthanize the animal
without engaging in some other endeavors to maintain the animal’s life?”).
73
See Animal Health Institute, supra note 52.
74
AVMLA, White Paper, supra note 47, at 13.
75
AVMA Task Force, supra note 69.
76
See Animal Health Institute, supra note 52 (“[C]onsider an elderly dog that has developed
a severely arthritic hip. Currently, an owner has several treatment options available, from hip
replacement surgery to less invasive and less costly alternatives. While some owners may indeed
opt for the hip replacement surgery, other owners may choose less expensive options. However,
a ‘guardian’ would be required to act in the ‘best’ interest of the animal; and if a neighbor, the
local humane society or a local college professor believes that hip replacement surgery is in the
best interest of the animal, the dog’s caretaker could be forced to accept that option—affordable
or not.”).
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veterinary bills.77 This line of arguments also raises questions about the
standards that will govern a veterinarian’s duty to advise her clients about
treatment options, including whether “best interest of the animal” or “best
interests of the guardian” will take precedence.78
While many of these arguments are more plausible than the ones
discussed earlier in this Part, they still rely on an assumption that courts will
import the legal meaning of guardian in human relationships into animal law
and thus will confuse the intended meaning of “guardian” in the animal context
with its legal meaning in other contexts. And, in some cases, this premise has
been argued very directly. According to the AHI, “There is no doubt that
inserting the word ‘guardian’ in place of ‘owner’ in describing the relationship
between a human and a pet would be regarded by courts as a meaningful
change.”79 This direct claim that courts would consider it a meaningful change
for the term “guardian” to describe the owner-pet relationship does not appear
to be based on any legal authority. There is no evidence that any court actually
has considered such a change meaningful, and it seems unlikely that any courts
would, given the care that has been used in defining this term in animal statutes.
It is not clear why many of the opponents of animal guardian laws seem
so sure that courts will consider this change meaningful or why so many
arguments seem to be based on the premise that the meaning of “guardian” in
human relationships will necessarily be applied to human-animal ones. The
drafters of the animal guardian statutes have been very careful to define and
limit the meaning of this term in animal law.80 In addition, there is certainly a
good deal of precedent for a word such as “guardian” to carry different legal
meaning in different statutory uses.81
Many of the more recent statutes that have moved to guardian language
in the animal context have sought to avoid any legal confusion by electing to use
the term “owner/guardian”82—a joined term that does not carry all the legal
baggage of “guardian.” But even those statutes that have opted to use
“guardian” have carefully defined this term very narrowly and specifically in the
context of the statute. Boulder, Colorado, the first jurisdiction to make this
AVMLA, White Paper, supra note 47, at 12 (“If animals are no longer property of an
owner but wards of a guardian, will the guardian be required to bear the full cost of veterinary
care and treatment of an animal because it is in ‘the best interest of the animal,’ even though the
guardian has directed the treatment not be provided, declined to have the treatment done, or told
the veterinarian that [the guardian] will not pay the bill for such treatment?”) (citation omitted)).
78
See id. at 12-13.
79
Animal Health Institute, supra note 52.
80
See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 4-1-1(a)(4) (Supp. 2006).
81
See BLACK’S LAW D ICTIONARY 725-26 (8th ed. 2004) (defining many of the legal uses of the
term “guardian”); see also notes 88-103 and accompanying text.
82
See, e.g., SANTA CLARA COUNTY, CAL., ORDINANCE NS-300.745 (Apr. 10, 2006), available at
http://www.sccgov.org/SCC/docs/SCC
Public
Portal/keyboard
agenda/BOS
Agenda/2006/April 25, 2006/TMPKeyboard201481938.pdf); BLOOMINGTON, IND., CODE §
7.01.010 (2008), available at http://bloomington.in.gov/code/; S T. LOUIS, MO., REVISED CITY CODE
§ 10.04.010(P) (2006), available at http://www.slpl.lib.mo.us/cco/code/data/t1004.htm.
77
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change, simply defined “guardian” to mean “owner.”83 Marin County’s Animal
Control Code states the following in its definitions: “The use of the word
‘guardian’ for all legal intent and purposes has the same meaning and effect as
the term ‘owner/guardian’ with respect to all federal, state and county law,
current and/or as modified.”84 Nearly identical language can be found in the
municipal code of Imperial Beach, California.85 According to San Francisco’s
Municipal Code, “‘Guardian’ shall have the same rights and responsibilities of an
owner, and both terms shall be used interchangeably.”86 As the only state
jurisdiction to use guardian language in reference to animals, Rhode Island’s
animal cruelty law defines “guardian” as someone “having the same rights and
responsibilities of an owner.”87
The very limited and specific definition of “guardian” in these animal
control and protection laws contrasts with the many different ways “guardian” is
defined in other laws. It is instructive to compare Rhode Island’s definition of
“guardian” in the animal law context with the various ways that word is defined
in relationships between people. Under Rhode Island probate law, one can be a
guardian of an adult or a guardian of a minor, and the duties of each type of
guardian are defined differently.88 There is a provision for a limited
guardianship for adults, which reflects the legislature’s intent to use the least
restrictive form of guardianship when someone is able to care for some, but not
all, of their own needs.89 In these cases, the guardian will only be authorized to
make decisions in areas where the ward lacks the capacity to do so.90 The duties
of a guardian of a minor are much broader; they generally mirror those of a
parent, and allow the guardian to make a broad range of decisions on behalf of
the minor.91 Rhode Island law also has a provision for “Good Samaritan
guardian” when the ward’s estate cannot afford to pay for the services of a
professional guardian.92 This type of guardian is afforded a level of immunity
not available to other guardians.93

See
BOULDER,
COLO.,
CODE
§
6-1-2
(2005),
available
at
http://www.colocode.com/boulder2/chapter6-1.htm (“‘Guardian’ means owner”).
84
MARIN
COUNTY,
CAL.,
CODE
§
8.04.020(h)
(2008),
available
at
http://municipalcodes.lexisnexis.com/codes/marincounty/.
85
IMPERIAL
BEACH,
CAL.,
CODE
§
6.04.020
(2008),
available
at
http://qcode.us/codes/imperialbeach/ (“The use of the term ‘owner/guardian’ for all legal
intent and purposes has the same meaning and effect as the term ‘owner’ . . . .”).
86
SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., HEALTH CODE, art. 1, § 41(m) (2008), available at
http://www.municode.com/Resources/gateway.asp?pid=14136&sid=5.
87
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 4-1-1(a)(4) (Supp. 2006).
88
Compare R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-15-29 (1995) with R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-15.1-28 (1995).
89
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 33-15-1, 33-15-2 (1995).
90
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-15-4 (Supp. 2006).
91
The guardian of a minor “shall take suitable charge of the person over whom he or she
shall be appointed guardian.” R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-15.1-28 (1995).
92
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-15-4.1 (Supp. 2006).
93
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-15-4.4 (Supp. 2006).
83

15

Hankin
(2009)

Stanford Journal of Animal Law & Policy | Vol. 2

Other jurisdictions have similarly diverse definitions of “guardian.” In
Illinois, for example, one can be the guardian of a person, guardian of an estate,
or both; there are also limited guardians, plenary guardians, temporary
guardians, and successor guardians.94 Maryland’s Health-Care Decisions Act
provides for the appointment of a guardian “for the limited purpose of making
one or more decisions related to the health care of that person.”95 California,
which has adopted the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act,96 authorizes advance
health care directives where one can nominate a guardian of the person,
guardian of the estate, or both.97 Guardians of the person have different rights
and duties from guardians of an estate,98 and there do not seem to be any
arguments, like we see in the animal law area, that these roles [might] get
confused.
Looking specifically at the use of the term “guardian” in the health-care
decision-making context, this term has very different implications if the guardian
was appointed by a court to make decisions for a previously competent adult,
versus a guardian who is acting in the role of a parent to make decisions for a
young child. Guardians appointed to make decisions for previously competent
adults often have less power in health care decision-making than other decisionmakers, such as family members acting as surrogate decision-makers.99 Under a
number of state statutes, guardians must get court approval for certain decisions
while others need not.100 Such limitations, intended to protect the interests of

See 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 3955/30 (West 2001).
MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-708(a)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2007).
96
1999 Cal. Stat. ch. 658 (Unif. Health-Care Decisions Act, codified at CAL. PROB. CODE §§
4670-4743).
97
See CAL. PROB. CODE § 4672(a) (West Supp. 2008).
98
See,
e.g.,
Illinois
State
Bar
Ass’n,
Being
a
Guardian,
http://www.illinoislawyerfinder.com/publicinfo/guardian.shtml (last visited July 18, 2008) (“A
Personal Guardian tends to the personal care of the ward, while an Estate Guardian is the
guardian of a person’s estate (real estate, personal property, money, and the like).”).
99
See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-805 (Supp. 2007) (describing the health-care
decision-making capacity of surrogate decision-makers, including decisions to withhold or
withdraw life-sustaining treatment, and describing such decisions as effective without prior court
approval); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-806 (Supp. 2007) (describing situations where
guardian decision-makers must receive court approval).
100 See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 21-2047.01 (2001) (limiting the powers of a guardian of an
incapacitated individual); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-708(c)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2007)
(listing the medical procedures where the guardian’s consent or approval must be authorized by
the court); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 54.25 (West 2008) (listing the duties and powers of a guardian, as
well as “the rights retained by individuals determined incompetent”).
94
95
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incapacitated adults,101 are built into statute-specific definitions of guardians’
powers and duties.102 No such limitations exist in the animal law statutes.
In contrast to guardians acting on behalf of adult wards, parental
guardians generally have fairly broad powers to make health care decisions on
behalf of their minor wards. In Rhode Island, for example, guardians of minor
wards have the powers of a parent, including the power to consent to medical
care and treatment.103 And health care decisions of parents for their children
generally receive a great deal of deference, since there is a strong presumption
that they are acting in the child’s best interest.104 The parent-child decisionmaking model seems to have more direct application to the animal-owner
context. Given the broad decision-making capacity that guardians have for minor
children, together with the statute-specific limits on guardians who make
decisions for adults, it is very unlikely that calling animal owners “guardians”
will really lead to limiting their health care treatment choices.
Another relevant term that can have very different statutory meanings is
“animal.” This word is defined in a broad range of statutes, from animal control
laws to state and federal statutes that protect animals from cruelty and abuse.
The definitions of “animal” in different statutes range from the all-inclusive
“every living creature except a human being”105 to the reptile-excluding “every
living warm-blooded creature except a human being,”106 to the considerably
narrower definition found in the federal Animal Welfare Act (AWA). The AWA,
which regulates the use of animals in research, the commercial sale and
transportation of animals, and exhibition of animals, defines “animal” to include
only dogs, cats, monkeys, rabbits, and certain rodents.107 Excluded are birds,
See Lawrence A. Frolick, Legal Implications of Mental Incapacity: Guardianship and
Conservatorship, ALI-ABA CLE: ELDER LAW ISSUES, ANSWERS, AND OPPORTUNITIES 67, 70 (2006)
(“The 1980’s [sic] saw almost every state revisit its guardianship statute; including amending the
definition of incapacity, instituting procedural safeguards for the alleged incapacitated person,
and imposing greater judicial scrutiny of the acts of guardians.”).
102 See id. at 75 (“[S]tate law determines the extent of the authority of the guardian of the
person and may require prior court approval for certain acts.”).
103 See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-15.1-28 (1995).
104 See discussion infra notes 159-171 and accompanying text.
105 See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 4-1-1(a)(1) (Supp. 2006).
106 See JAMES F. W ILSON, LAW AND ETHICS OF THE VETERINARY PROFESSION 72 (1988) (citing
Wis. Stat. § 947.01(1)).
107 7 U.S.C. § 2132(g) (2006) defines the term “animal” for purposes of the Animal Welfare
Act:
The term “animal” means any live or dead dog, cat, monkey (nonhuman primate
mammal), guinea pig, hamster, rabbit, or such other warm-blooded animal, as
the Secretary may determine is being used, or is intended for use, for research,
testing, experimentation, or exhibition purposes, or as a pet; but such term
excludes (1) birds, rats of the genus Rattus, and mice of the genus Mus, bred for
use in research, (2) horses not used for research purposes, and (3) other farm
animals, such as, but not limited to livestock or poultry, used or intended for use
as food or fiber, or livestock or poultry used or intended for use for improving
animal nutrition, breeding, management, or production efficiency, or for
101

17

Hankin
(2009)

Stanford Journal of Animal Law & Policy | Vol. 2

mice, rats, and all farm animals except horses, though horses are only “animals”
under the act when they are used for research purposes.108
Thus while opponents of animal guardian laws are correct when they
point out that the term “guardian” already has a significant legal meaning, this
term, like the term “animal,” actually has many different legal meanings, and
there is no reason to think that courts would not be able to assimilate yet another
one. Nonetheless, some legitimate arguments against using “guardian” to refer
to animals remain.
One of the more well-reasoned arguments against changing from “owner”
to “guardian” can be found in an opinion letter written by the Los Angeles Office
of the City Attorney, setting forth its reasons for not amending the city’s
Municipal Code.109 While acknowledging that many arguments against this
change “seem far fetched” and “carry no legal authority,” the City Attorney
nonetheless concluded that the name change might well cause confusion among
owners and veterinarians regarding the legal status of animals and
corresponding obligations to them.110 The letter sets forth a variety of
hypothetical arguments that animal advocates might use to advance animal
rights under “guardian” terminology.111 And although under state and federal
law, such arguments would lack legal authority,112 the city attorney recognized
that arguments that an animal guardian must act in the animal’s best interest
might “confuse the issue.”113 The letter further concluded that such confusion
could have unintended negative effects on city animal control organizations,
veterinarians, and volunteer animal workers.114 In other words, courts might
easily understand that the same word can have very different legal meanings
depending on the context; however, members of the public—such as animal
owners, veterinarians, and animal control officers—might be more likely to be
confused by such terminology.
D.

What the Arguments Imply about Health Care Decisions for Animals

If the confusion about the use of guardian language in reference to
animals in fact affects owner and veterinarian perceptions about treatment
options for animals, such a result would be an unfortunate, unintended
improving the quality of food or fiber. With respect to a dog, the term means all
dogs including those used for hunting, security, or breeding purposes.
108 See id.
109 Letter from Terree Bowers, Chief Deputy City Attorney of Los Angeles, to the Los
Angeles Board of Animal Services Commissioners (Sept. 11, 2002), available at
http://www.nabr.org/AnimalLaw/Guardianship/LACityAttorneyMemo.pdf.
110 See id. at 3-4.
111 Id.
112 One of the reasons cited for the lack of legal effect of the proposed name change was that
any city ordinance that attempted to change the status of animals would be preempted by state
law that classifies animals as personal property. See id. at 4.
113 See id. at 3.
114 Id. at 4-5.
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consequence. It certainly does not appear that the proponents of these laws
intended to limit individuals’ abilities to make health care treatment choices for
their animals.115 Instead, proponents hoped that by changing the legal language
from “owner” to “guardian,” public attitudes and understanding about our
responsibilities to animals would change for the better.116 The laws were
intended to serve a primarily educational role, helping people to see that they
have greater responsibilities to their pets than to other property that they own,
even if these laws did not actually alter animals’ legal status as property.117 But
the fact remains that these laws have met with a great deal of opposition—from
groups as disparate as state governments, veterinary associations, and animal
welfare groups—and such opposition may be hard to overcome.
While some of these anti-guardian arguments are indeed quite farfetched,118—no one is seriously likely to challenge spay/neuter policies by
evoking a pet’s “reproductive rights”—other arguments have sufficient merit to
be taken seriously. What is not clear, however, is whether the legitimate concerns
that have been raised outweigh the potential benefits of these laws. Nonetheless,
given the potential for confusion, the various concerns raised, and the general
resistance to these initiatives, perhaps it is better to come up with alternative
models for health care decision-making for companion animals.
A number of the concerns raised regarding the potential confusion of
calling animal owners “guardians” lead to some more interesting normative
questions: Are there circumstances under which a veterinarian should take an
animal’s best interest into account? How should the animal’s best interest be
weighed against the owner’s ability to pay? Should owners of animal property be
able to make unchecked decisions about their medical treatment, even when
those decisions are viewed as clearly harmful to the animal? The next Part of this
Article turns to the lessons learned in making difficult health-care decisions in
human medicine as a background for exploring these questions in veterinary
medicine.

II.

Human Health-Care Decision-making: Lessons Learned

In human health-care decision-making, the predominant model is based
on the doctrine of informed consent, the notion that “[e]very human being of
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his
own body.”119 In the law, the informed consent doctrine is grounded in both
common law tort principles120 and in constitutional rights to privacy and
See, e.g., The Guardian Campaign, supra note 21.
See Nolen, supra note 1.
117 See supra notes 21-39 and accompanying text.
118 See Letter from Terree Bowers, supra note 109.
119 Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
120 See Walter Wadlington, Medical Decision Making for and by Children: Tensions Between
Parent, State, and Child, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 311, 312 (discussing a physician’s duty under the
115
116
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liberty.121 In the language of bioethics, this principle is framed as “respect for
autonomy” and generally trumps other competing principles in health-care
decision-making for competent patients.122 Unfortunately, this important starting
point for human health-care decisions has virtually no application in the
veterinary field, where the animal patients have neither legal nor actual
competence to make such choices.123 What may be very relevant, however, are
the decision-making models employed for those unable to make their own
decisions and whose health-care decisions must be made by others. This Part will
start with a discussion of the substituted judgment and best interests standards
as it focuses on health-care decision making for three categories of patients who
are unable to make their own decisions: formerly competent adults who have
become incapacitated, disabled adults who have never had the capacity to make
health care decisions, and young children who lack competence to make their
own medical decisions. The final category, where parents make decisions for
their children, will be examined in further detail, with a particular focus on cases
where parents’ decisions have been challenged.
A.
Making Decisions for Patients Without Decision Capacity: Substituted
Judgment and Best Interests Standards
Two primary models of health-care decision-making have been used
when the patients themselves are unable to make their own decisions:
substituted judgment and best interests.124 Under the substituted judgment
standard, a substitute decision-maker (often referred to as the “surrogate”) tries
to base the decision, as closely as possible, on the choice the patient would have
made were she competent and able to make the choice herself.125 According to
one court, “the surrogate first tries to determine if the patient had expressed
explicit intent regarding this type of medical treatment prior to becoming
incompetent. Where no clear intent exists, the patient’s personal value system
must guide the surrogate.”126 Courts have also considered factors such as the

doctrine of informed consent).
121 See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
122 See Jennifer L. Rosato, Using Bioethics Discourse To Determine When Parents Should Make
Health Care Decisions For Their Children: Is Deference Justified?, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 1 (2000).
123 See, e.g., Jennifer Fiala, AVMA Redrafts Informed Consent, DVM, Dec. 2007 (“Rewrite
protects DVMs against comparisons to human medicine . . . .”); see also infra notes 263-267 and
accompanying text.
124 See BARRY R. FURROW , B IOETHICS: H EALTH CARE LAW & E THICS 287 (6th ed. 2008); see also
In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1984).
125 See In re Westchester County Med. Ctr., 531 N.E.2d 607, 619 (N.Y. 1988) (Simons, J.,
dissenting) (“Although courts apply this theory differently, generally the obligation of the court
when implementing substituted judgment is to ensure that a surrogate of the patient, usually a
family member or a guardian, effectuates as nearly as possible the decision the incompetent
would make if he or she were able to state it.”).
126 In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 299 (Ill. 1989) (citation omitted).
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patient’s life history and life goals, attitude toward health care, and potential
quality of life in upholding decisions based on substituted judgment.127
The substituted judgment standard has been codified into many state
statutes on health care decision-making. For example, the Florida Health Care
Advance Directives Act requires that health care decisions be made which the
surrogate “believes the principal would have made under the circumstances.”128
Similarly, the Maryland Health Care Decision Act provides that “[a]ny person
authorized to make health care decisions for another under this section shall base
those decisions on the wishes of the patient.”129 The statute then lists a number of
factors to use to determine the patient’s wishes, including the patient’s expressed
preferences, religious and moral beliefs, and reactions to similar treatment for
another.130
The substituted judgment standard, by directing that decisions be made
consistent with the patient’s expressed or implied wishes, seeks to respect the
autonomy of patients who lack decision-making capacity.131 This goal of
substituted judgment can be clearly seen in the intent section of Florida’s statute,
which sets out the legislative finding that “every competent adult has the
fundamental right of self-determination regarding decisions pertaining to his or
her own health,” and the statute’s purpose as “ensur[ing] that such right is not
lost or diminished by virtue of later physical or mental incapacity.”132
This model of substituted judgment makes the most sense in cases where
the patient formerly had decisional capacity and had at that time expressed some
intent about her wishes, either directly or indirectly. In at least one case,
however, this approach was used where the patient in question had never had
the capacity to make health care decisions. In Superintendent of Belchertown State
School v. Saikewicz, 133 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was reviewing
a probate court decision not to order potentially life-prolonging chemotherapy to
See FURROW, supra note 124, at 302.
FLA. S TAT. ANN. § 765.205(1)(b) (West Supp. 2008).
129 MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(c)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2007).
130 The complete list consists of:
(i) Current diagnosis and prognosis with and without the treatment at issue;
(ii) Expressed preferences regarding the provision of, or the withholding or
withdrawal of, the specific treatment at issue or of similar treatments;
(iii) Relevant religious and moral beliefs and personal values;
(iv) Behavior, attitudes, and past conduct with respect to the treatment at issue
and medical treatment generally;
(v) Reactions to the provision of, or the withholding or withdrawal of, a similar
treatment for another individual; and
(vi) Expressed concerns about the effect on the family or intimate friends of the
patient if a treatment were provided, withheld, or withdrawn.
Id. § 5-605(c)(2).
131 See, e.g., In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399, 408 (Mich. 1995) (“[T]he right the surrogate is
seeking to effectuate is the incompetent patient’s right to control his own life . . . .”).
132 FLA. S TAT. A NN. § 765.102(1)-(2) (West 2005).
133 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
127
128
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treat the acute leukemia of a 67-year-old man with an IQ of 10 and a mental age
of approximately 2 years, 10 months. In upholding the lower court’s decision,
which was based on the recommendation of a guardian ad litem, the Court
determined that both were right when they made an effort to base the choice on
the patient’s “actual interests and preferences.”134 After acknowledging the
state’s traditional parens patriae power to “protect the . . . ‘best interests’ of the
incompetent person,”135 the court nevertheless preferred to use the substituted
judgment standard because it evidences respect for individual autonomy.136 In
setting out how such a standard would work in cases where patients had never
had the capacity to make health care decisions, the court came up with the
following:
[T]he decision in cases such as this should be that which would be
made by the incompetent person, if that person were competent,
but taking into account the present and future incompetency of the
individual as one of the factors which would necessarily enter into
the decision-making process of the competent person.137
The speculative nature of this standard has been criticized as
unworkable.138 In the words of an expert witness in a later case, asking what a
never-competent person would choose in such a hypothetical brief window of
competence would be similar to asking the question “‘if it snowed all summer
would it then be winter?’”139 For similar reasons, the substituted judgment
standard would not likely have any meaningful application in the veterinary
context. Animals do not have the capacity to make their own health care
decisions. As such, it would make little sense to speculate what an animal might
choose if it were somehow competent to make the decision, but taking into
account its present and future status as an animal (and the limited ability to
understand that goes along with that status) as a factor in making the relevant
choice.
What is interesting about Saikewicz, however, is the extent to which its
substituted judgment standard appears to rely on factors that might better be
framed within a best interest standard. Best interest standards, as will be
discussed in more detail below, generally weigh the risks and benefits of various
treatment options to determine what is best for the individual patient.140 In
upholding the probate court’s decision, the Saikewicz court noted with approval
the factors considered by the lower court that weighed against the chemotherapy
134
135
136
137
138
139
140

Id. at 431.
Id. at 427.
Id. at 431.
Id.
See, e.g., FURROW, supra note 124, at 287.
In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72-73 (N.Y. 1981).
See infra notes 144-145 and accompanying text.
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treatment.141 The first four factors—the patient’s age, the treatment’s likely side
effects, the low probability that the treatment would result in remission, coupled
with the certainty it would cause immediate suffering—which the court
characterized as “considerations that any individual would weigh carefully,”142
look very much like the kind of risk/benefit calculus that is the hallmark of the
best interest test. The court then discussed a fifth factor, the patient’s inability to
cooperate with the treatment because of his inability to understand why he was
being subjected to it, framing these considerations as “unique to this individual
and . . . therefore . . . essential to the proper exercise of substituted judgment.”143
These same points, however, might more accurately be framed as factors that
should be weighed into a best interest analysis.
Under a best interest analysis, treatment decisions for those unable to
make their own choices are based on a weighing of the burdens and benefits of
that treatment.144 In cases where potentially life-saving treatment may be
withheld, the benefits considered can include the patient’s quality of life. Under
this risk-benefit calculus, the decision-maker must opt in favor of treatment
whenever its benefits outweigh its risks.145 The best interest standard is used in
cases where a formerly competent patient’s wishes are simply not known; it is
also the standard most commonly used when a patient has never had decisional
competence.
State health care decision-making statutes, which authorize proxy
decision-makers to make health-care choices for formerly competent patients,
instruct those decision-makers to make the choices in accordance with the
patient’s wishes.146 However, if the wishes of the patient cannot be determined (if
they are not known, or in some instances, not clear), the proxy is directed to
make the decision according to the patient’s best interests.147 Some of the statutes
even list factors to consider in determining a patient’s best interests, which can
include the benefits and risks of the treatment choices; the amount of pain or
discomfort that can be expected with and without the treatment; and the
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 432.
Id.
143 Id.
144 See, e.g., MD. CODE A NN., HEALTH-GEN.§ 5-601(e) (West 2009) (“‘Best interest’ means that
the benefits to the individual resulting from a treatment outweigh the burdens to the individual
resulting from that treatment . . . .”).
145 See Rosato, supra note 122, at 10 (“The primary focus [of the best interest standard in the
context of parental decision-making for children] appears to be the child’s best interests: if the
benefits of treatment outweigh its risks, then treatment must be given to the child.”).
146 See supra notes 128-129.
147 See, e.g., FLA . STAT. ANN. § 765.205(1)(b) (West 2009) (“If there is no indication of what the
principal would have chosen, the surrogate may consider the patient’s best interest in deciding
that proposed treatments are to be withheld or that treatments currently in effect are to be
withdrawn.”); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(c)(1) (West 2009) (“Any person authorized
to make health care decisions for another under this section shall base those decisions on the
wishes of the patient and, if the wishes of the patient are unknown or unclear, on the patient’s
best interest.”).
141
142
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likelihood of recovery with and without the treatment.148 Many of these factors
included under the best interest standard look surprisingly close to those
considered by the Saikewicz court under what it purported to call a substituted
judgment standard.
In most cases where the patient has never had decisional competence,
including those involving developmentally disabled adults and young children,
courts use the best interest standard. For example, In re Storar came before the
New York Court of Appeals when the mother and legal guardian of a 52-yearold man with a mental age of 18 months requested that blood transfusions, part
of the treatment for terminal bladder cancer, be discontinued.149 After
determining that it was not realistic to try to determine the wishes of a patient
who had never been competent, the court used a best interest standard to decide
that the transfusions should be continued.150 While recognizing that the patient
disliked the transfusions and that his mother, who visited him nearly every day,
“wanted the transfusions discontinued because she only wanted her son to be
comfortable,”151 the court nonetheless made its own best determination about
what was in the best interests of the patient. The court thus ordered the
transfusions continued because “[they] did not involve excessive pain and . . .
without them his mental and physical abilities would not be maintained at the
usual level.”152 By weighing the benefits and burdens of the treatment in
question, the court came out on the side of the treatment.
B.

Health-Care Decision-Making for Minor Children

The best interest model is also the standard used in evaluating treatment
choices for young children.153 Parents generally have both the right and the
One statute’s complete list is as follows:
(1) The effect of the treatment on the physical, emotional, and cognitive functions
of the individual;
(2) The degree of physical pain or discomfort caused to the individual by the
treatment, or the withholding or withdrawal of the treatment;
(3) The degree to which the individual’s medical condition, the treatment, or the
withholding or withdrawal of treatment result in a severe and continuing
impairment of the dignity of the individual by subjecting the individual to a
condition of extreme humiliation and dependency;
(4) The effect of the treatment on the life expectancy of the individual;
(5) The prognosis of the individual for recovery, with and without the treatment;
(6) The risks, side effects, and benefits of the treatment or the withholding or
withdrawal of the treatment; and
(7) The religious beliefs and basic values of the individual receiving treatment, to
the extent these may assist the decision maker in determining best interest.
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN.§ 5-601(e) (West 2009).
149 In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 66, 68-69 (N.Y. 1981).
150 Id. at 72-73.
151 Id. at 70.
152 Id. at 73.
153 Older children are often able to exercise their own decisional capacity under the “mature
148
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responsibility to make health-care treatment decisions for their children, not only
because it is presumed that they will act in the child’s best interest, but because
they also have a legal duty to do so.154 But the state, through its parens patriae
power, also has an interest in the welfare of children.155 Thus, when a parent’s
choice about her child’s health care appears to go against the child’s best interest,
the state can intervene to see that the child’s interests are met.
The right of parents to make fundamental decisions for their children,
including decisions about a child’s health care, has been recognized as a common
law principle,156 as well as one that is protected by both statutes and the
constitution.157 Various rationales have been advanced to support this parental
authority, including “preserving the integrity of the family [by] maintaining the
autonomy of the parent-child relationship,”158 respecting the parents’ interests in
raising their children according to their own system of values; and protecting
children’s interests in being cared for by those who know them best and will be
most likely to act in their best interests.159 However, while courts recognize the
importance and value of parental autonomy over minor children, they are also
quick to point out that such autonomy is not absolute.160
Limiting the parents’ rights to make decisions for their minor children is
the state’s duty under the parens patriae doctrine to protect minor children from

minors” doctrine. See FURROW, supra note 124, at 350 (“Parental rights to make health care
decisions for their children . . . may be . . . terminated earlier [than the age of majority] if the child
is a ‘mature minor,’ a condition governed by statute (in some states) or the common law (in other
states) or both.” Generally, the older the child, the more the child’s own choices are taken into
account. See id. at 349 (“[T]he application of the ‘substituted judgment’ standard seems
appropriate as the children approach majority . . . .”).
154 See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. C HILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 102 (5th
ed. 2001).
155 See infra text accompanying notes 161-163.
156 See, e.g., Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1115 (Del. 1991).
157 See In re Petra B., 265 Cal. Rptr. 342, 346 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). The U.S. Supreme Court has
recognized that the fundamental liberty of the parents to rear their children emanates from the
substantive guarantee of liberty found in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Pursuant to the Due Process Clause, parents have a constitutional right to the custody, care, and
control of their children. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000) (noting that the
substantive component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment encapsulates
parents’ fundamental liberty interest in the “care, custody, and control of their children,” which
is one of the “oldest fundamental liberty interests recognized by [the Supreme Court]”); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture
of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation
for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
535 (1925) (explaining that those who rear the child have the right and the duty to prepare the
child for future obligations).
158 Newmark, 588 A.2d at 1115.
159 See James G. Dwyer, Parents’ Religion and Children’s Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of
Parents’ Rights, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1371, 1373 (1994).
160 See, e.g., In re Petra B., 265 Cal. Rptr. at 346; Newmark, 588 A.2d at 1116 (“We also
recognize that parental autonomy over minor children is not an absolute right.”).
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harm.161 Thus while courts are reluctant to infringe on the autonomy of parents
to make medical care decisions for their children, they will do so when such
intervention is necessary to safeguard the child’s welfare and to serve his best
interests.162 In determining the child’s best interests in medical treatment cases,
courts consider factors such as the risks of the treatment, the likelihood that the
treatment will be successful, the medical profession’s view of the treatment, and
the harm that the child may suffer.163
In cases in which parental decision-making has been challenged, courts
typically start with a presumption of deference to the parent’s decision—that is, a
presumption that the parents will act in the child’s best interests.164 This
presumption is generally overcome only in extreme cases—often where parents,
because of religious or philosophical convictions, refuse life-saving therapy for
their children. For example, courts will order the administration of blood
transfusions for children whose Jehovah’s Witness parents refuse the
intervention.165 These cases, where courts order blood transfusions over parents’
objections, have been called easy ones to resolve, because the relatively benign
intervention happens once, it has a high probability of success, and without the
transfusion the child’s life may be threatened.166
The more difficult cases involve choices of whether to treat childhood
cancer with chemotherapy, where the treatment is certain to cause the child a
great deal of suffering and the chance of success from the treatment is less
certain.167 In such cases, courts are more likely to defer to the decisions of parents
when they opt against treatment, even where such a choice will result in the
child’s death.168 Thus in Newmark v. Williams, for example, the court upheld the
choices of a child’s Christian Scientist parents who refused to have his Burkitt’s
lymphoma treated by a chemotherapy regimen that offered a 40% chance of a
cure.169 Without the treatment, the child was expected to die.170 Nonetheless,
after balancing parental autonomy with the state’s right to protect minor
children, and reviewing the risks and benefits of the offered treatment, the court
determined that it was in the child’s best interests to remain in his parents’
custody and not be treated.171
Whether the courts ultimately choose to uphold or override the parents’
choices, the mechanism through which these cases come before the courts are
state child protective services statutes—the laws that protect children from abuse
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171

See Hartsell, supra note 58, at 516-17.
See In re Petra B., 265 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
See id.; Newmark, 588 A.2d at 1116-18.
See Rosato, supra note 122, at 7.
See, e.g., J.V. v. State, 516 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
See Wadlington, supra note 120, at 326.
See, e.g., Newmark, 588 A.2d 1108.
See id.
Id. at 1118-19.
Id.
Id. at 1120.
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and neglect through mandated reporting.172 And courts will override parents’
decisions only when the conditions for such statutes are met—that is, when the
parents’ choices amount to abuse or neglect.173 This approach has been
challenged by commentators,174 who question whether such statutes represent
the best way to resolve these difficult questions of children’s medical care
decision-making.175
C.

Potential Application to Animal Care Decision-Making

When looking at health care decision-making approaches for those who
lack competence to make their own decisions—formerly competent adults who
have become incapacitated, disabled adults who have never had the capacity to
make health care decisions, and young children who lack competence to make
their own medical decisions—those that appear to translate most readily into the
animal law context are models of decision-making for someone who has never
had decisional capacity. Thus, of the various models discussed above for making
health-care decisions for those unable to do so for themselves, the one that seems
to have the most relevance for making such decisions for companion animals is
the best-interest model: considering the best interests of a patient unable make
the decision herself.
One of the primary places we see the best-interest model employed in
human medicine is when parents make decisions on behalf of their children.176
Parents are presumed to act in their child’s best interest, and this presumption
usually is not challenged unless the decision violates a child abuse or neglect
law.177 Using child abuse and neglect statutes as a way of challenging parents’
medical decisions for their children has been criticized on a number of counts,178
See, e.g., id. at 1110 (concluding that the child was not abused or neglected under state
law); see also FURROW, supra note 124, at 348.
173 See Wadlington, supra note 120, at 322-23 (“The child abuse reporting statutes have
special relevance to children’s medical care for two reasons. First, the ways in which the statutes
encourage the reporting of potential abuse illustrate a very strong public policy regarding the
need to protect children from some parental conduct. . . . The second relevant facet of the child
abuse reporting laws is that the definition of what qualifies as reportable conduct has
increasingly been extended to cases of medical neglect.”).
174 See id.; see also Rosato, supra note 122, at 2 (criticizing the cases challenging parents’
authority to make medical decisions for their children as “inappropriately considered under the
legal rubric of abuse or neglect”).
175 See Wadlington, supra note 120, at 336.
176 See B EAUCHAMP & C HILDRESS, supra note 154, at 102.
177 Id. (“It was assumed in law that parents generally do act in their children’s best interests
and that the state should not interfere except in extreme circumstances in which the state and the
parents disagree about some decision with potentially serious consequences for the child . . . .”).
178 See, e.g., Jana C. Merrick, Spiritual Healing, Sick Kids and the Law: Inequities in the American
Health Care System, 29 AM. J. L. & MED. 269, 279 (2003) (arguing that because states are “not
required to . . . find[] abuse or neglect in cases where medical care was withheld based on a
parent’s religious beliefs,” the best interests of children may not be met); Stephen A. Newman,
Baby Doe, Congress and the States: Challenging the Federal Treatment Standard for Impaired Infants, 15
172
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and such criticism is certainly warranted. Interestingly, however, it may be that a
similar approach of using animal cruelty laws to challenge questionable
decisions made on behalf of companion animals is exactly the way to strike the
right balance for owners, animals, and the veterinarians who treat them. This
question and others concerning treatment choices for companion animals will be
explored in the next Part.

III. Making Health-Care Decisions for Our Companion
Animals
This Part will look at how helpful the legal framework for clinical
decision-making in human medicine can be in answering similar questions in
veterinary medicine. Some important similarities between the two fields suggest
that many of the lessons learned in human medical encounters may have
something to teach us about how to answer these questions in the veterinary
context.179 Nonetheless, enough differences exist between the two fields—and
between humans and non-human animals—that the principles of decisionmaking in human medicine will at least need to be modified for the veterinary
field. After discussing both similarities and differences between the fields of
human and veterinary medicine, this Part will propose a framework for
veterinary clinical decision-making by addressing a series of questions: Who
decides what level of care an animal receives? What factors are included in these
decisions and to what extent can economic concerns be considered? And finally,
how might changes in the law affect the way these decisions are made?
A.

Similarities Between Human Health Care and Veterinary Medicine

One of the reasons that it makes sense to turn to human medicine as a
guide for making difficult decisions in veterinary medicine is the simple fact that
many people consider their companion animals to be part of their family.180 And
as such, they make choices about treating their animals in similar ways to the
choices they make for their human family members.181 The evidence that
companion animals are considered family members can be seen in all sorts of
ways: more and more people take their animals on vacations with them,182 give
AM. J. L. & MED . 1 (1989).
179 See Rebecca Coombes, Do Vets and Doctors Face Similar Ethical Challenges?, 331 BRIT. MED.
J. 1227 (2005).
180 See Rebecca J. Huss, Valuation in Veterinary Malpractice, 35 LOY. U. C HI. L.J. 479, 481 (2004)
(citing an American Pet Products Manufacturers Association National Pet Owners Survey).
181 Id. at 483-84.
182 See, e.g., Pet Travel, http://www.pettravel.com/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2009); Pets on the
Go, Pet Travel Unleashed, http://www.petsonthego.com/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2009); Pets
Welcome, It’s a Pet Friendly Universe Out There, http://www.petswelcome.com/ (last visited
Feb. 9, 2009).
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them birthday presents,183 get them pet sitters or leave them in “doggie day care”
while at work,184 and make serious efforts to provide for the animals’ care after
their human owner’s death.185 An even more vivid reminder of just how highly
people value their animals was demonstrated by all of those who refused to
evacuate Hurricane Katrina-damaged New Orleans without their animals.186
These refusals caused so many problems that the evacuation policy was quickly
changed, and those Texas residents boarding the buses to evacuate as Hurricane
Rita approached were allowed to bring their pets along.187 Legislation codifying
this change soon followed in the form of the Pets Evacuation and Transportation
Standards Act of 2006 (PETS), which requires state and local authorities to
consider the needs of people’s pets and service animals in evacuation plans.188
Paralleling these developments are the expanded expectations that many
people have about the kind of veterinary care that their companion animals
should receive. Because of the way we value our pets, we are much more likely
to spend money on their care and expect that they will receive medical care when
they are sick or injured akin to the treatment choices available in human
medicine.189 Dogs and cats now benefit from increasingly sophisticated
diagnostic techniques including ultrasound, MRIs, digital radiography, and CT
scans.190 Treatment options include surgery, chemotherapy, and radiation
treatments for cancer; hip replacements and other complicated surgeries for
orthopedic problems; and even dialysis and kidney transplants to treat kidney
disease.191
In similar ways to human medicine, having more treatment options
available in veterinary medicine means being faced with increasingly difficult
choices concerning an animal’s treatment. Veterinary journals and texts
See,
e.g.,
Perky
Paws
Café,
Dog
and
Cat
Birthday
Gifts,
http://www.perkypawscafe.com/items/holiday~special-occasion/dog~cat-birthdaygifts/list.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2009).
184 See, e.g., Sharene Azimi, Move Over Subway, Dog Day Care Is the Hot New Franchise,
COLUM. NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 1, 2005, available at http://jscms.jrn.columbia.edu/cns/2005-0301/azimi-doggydaycare.
185 See Hankin, supra note 13, at 358-65 & nn.198-223 (discussing enforceable trusts and other
ways of assuring that our pets are cared for after we die).
186 See, e.g., Craig Guillot, Not Without My Dog: For Many, Leaving Four-Legged Companions
Behind Wasn’t an Option, 33 BARK 85 (2005).
187 See Gina Spadafori, Including Pets in Evacuation Plans Could Save Human Lives, BOSTON
GLOBE, Oct. 13, 2005, at C6, available at http://www.boston.com/yourlife/home/
articles/2005/10/13/including_pets_in_evacuation_plans_could_save_human_lives/.
188 See Pets Evacuation and Transportation Standards Act of 2006 (PETS), Pub. L. No. 109308, § 2, 120 Stat. 1725, 1725 (amending the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act to ensure that “[s]tate and local emergency preparedness operational plans”
address “the needs of individuals with household pets and service animals prior to, during, and
following a major disaster or emergency.”).
189 See Nunalee & Weedon, supra note 14, at 139-40 (discussing pet owners’ desires to pursue
sophisticated treatment and high-tech diagnostic tools for their pets).
190 See Mary Battiata, Whose Life Is It Anyway?, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 2004, at W16.
191 Id.
183
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increasingly address questions such as how aggressively to treat dogs with
cancer.192 Owners of animals with cancer are faced with choices that include no
treatment or palliative treatment only; standard surgery, chemotherapy, or
radiation therapies that are often thought to produce disappointing results; or
clinical trials that aim to bring state-of-the-art medicine into the veterinary
arena.193 Veterinary hospice care for animals at the end of life is common enough
that the American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA) has published
hospice care guidelines.194 And at many veterinary hospitals, intensive care is
available, and reports of animals being kept alive on “life support” are not
uncommon.195 While this last example may be seen as extreme, it is another
illustration of the extent to which knowledge gained in human medicine is being
imported into veterinary medicine.
A wider range and greater sophistication of treatment options also means
that more money is being spent on veterinary treatment.196 A 2003 article in
Consumer Reports details a number of expensive treatment options available for
dogs and cats, including cardiac pacemakers, expensive joint surgeries, and
expensive drugs to treat a wide range of ailments.197 The article also reports that
veterinary spending nearly tripled from 1991 to 2001, to over $18 billion, and that
cost of veterinary treatment since 1997 has increased at more than twice the rate
of overall inflation.198 The increased expenditure is, in part, attributed to
improvements in veterinary medicine that give owners more choices, albeit
expensive ones, for treating their animals.199
An additional measure of the growing acceptance of spending significant
amounts on veterinary care is the increasing judicial recognition of reasonable
veterinary expenses as a measure of damages when an animal is tortiously
injured or killed. In the past, damages in tort cases involving injured animals
were generally limited to the animal’s “replacement value.”200 Owners of an
See BERNARD E. ROLLIN, AN INTRODUCTION TO VETERINARY MEDICAL ETHICS: THEORY AND
CASES 167-70 (1999) (Case 23: Clients who insist on continuing treatment for failing dog with
cancer); see also Coombes, supra note 179; AAHA Senior Care Guidelines Task Force, AAHA Senior
Care Guidelines for Dogs and Cats, 41 J. AM. ANIMAL HOSP. ASS’N 49 (2005), available at
http://www.aahanet.org/PublicDocuments/Senior_Care_final.pdf [hereinafter AAHA, Senior
Care Guidelines].
193 See,
e.g., Penn Veterinary Medicine, Veterinary Clinical Investigation Center,
http://research.vet.upenn.edu/vcic/CurrentClinicalTrials/tabid/94/Default.aspx (last visited
Feb. 9, 2009).
194 See AAHA, Senior Care Guidelines, supra note 192, at 56.
195 See Jon Katz, When Should You Put Your Dog Down? How to Make a Decision You Never
Want to Make, SLATE, Oct. 28, 2003, http://www.slate.com/id/2090327 (“Researching my last
book, I visited an emergency-care clinic that had six dogs on respirators at a cost of nearly $1000
per week per dog.”).
196 See Veterinary Care Without the Bite, CONSUMER REP., July 2003.
197 Id. (reporting on $3000 pacemakers for dogs with cardiac problems, $8000 kidney
transplants for cats, and the wide range of pharmaceuticals used in veterinary care).
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 See, e.g., Daughen v. Fox, 539 A.2d 858, 864 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (“Under Pennsylvania
192
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injured dog were thus unable to recover expenses from those responsible for the
dog’s injury whenever the cost of treating the dog exceeded its fair market
value.201 Increasingly, however, courts are departing from this harsh approach
and allowing the recovery of “reasonable veterinary expenses,” even when those
expenses far exceed an animal’s market value.202 Some states have even passed
legislation recognizing reasonable veterinary expenses as a measure of damages
in injured animal cases. A Maryland statute, for example, expands the definition
of allowed compensatory damages for the injury of a pet to include, “the
reasonable and necessary cost of veterinary care” up to a $7,500 limit.203 This
approach is likely to expand even further in the wake of the many cases being
brought by owners whose animals became sick or died from eating contaminated
pet food.204
B.

Major Differences Between Human Health Care and Veterinary Medicine

Despite the growing similarities between human health care and
veterinary medicine, important differences remain—differences that are
significant enough that decision-making models cannot be imported wholesale
into the veterinary context. The primary difference, of course, is the moral205 and
legal status of animals. As much as we might consider our companion animals to
be part of our families, the simple fact remains that they are animals. As nonhuman animals they may not be morally entitled,206 and are certainly not legally
entitled to the same rights as humans. Legally, animals are still considered
property, though there are trends in a number of areas of law that treat animals

law, a dog is personal property. The fundamental purpose of damages for an injury to or
destruction of property by tortious conduct of another is to compensate the injured party for the
actual loss suffered.”).
201 See, e.g., id.
202 See, e.g., Hyland v. Borras, 719 A.2d 662 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (allowing
recovery of reasonable veterinary expenses even when those expenses exceeded the animal’s
market value by fivefold); see also Burgess v. Shampooch Pet Indus., Inc., 131 P.3d 1248, 1252
(Kan. Ct. App. 2006) (“[W]hen an injured pet dog with no discernable market value is restored to
its previous health, the measure of damages may include, but is not limited to, the reasonable
and customary cost of necessary veterinary care and treatment.”).
203 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-110(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2006).
204 See,
e.g., A.B. 1965, 213th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2008), available at
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2008/Bills/A2000/1965_I1.PDF (authorizing civil action for certain
damages when a pet animal “becomes ill, is injured, or dies from ingesting or coming into contact
with adulterated pet food”; damages may include, but are not limited to “veterinary expenses
incurred in treating the animal”).
205 For a discussion of the moral status of animals, see Martha C. Nussbaum, Beyond
“Compassion and Humanity”: Justice for Nonhuman Animals, in ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES
AND NEW DIRECTIONS 299 (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2004).
206 See Jerrold Tannenbaum, Veterinary Medical Ethics: A Focus of Conflicting Interests, 49 J.
SOC. ISSUES 143, 147 (1993) (discussing the moral value of animals in terms of “what is morally
owed” to them).
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quite differently from inanimate property.207 However, when it comes to making
decisions about an animal’s health care, and even its life, there have been few
checks on an owner’s unlimited discretion to make those decisions, however
harmful they might be to the animal.208
Another important difference in veterinary medicine is the acceptance of
euthanasia as a treatment option. Humane euthanasia is not only a common
practice in veterinary medicine; it is specifically mentioned as an ethical choice in
the profession’s code of ethics.209 There is even a 1905 California law, still on the
books, that requires that certain “unfit” animals be euthanized, though the law
does provide exemptions for an “owner keeping any old or diseased animal
belonging to him on his own premises with proper care.”210 There is a wide range
of reasons why euthanasia is chosen in veterinary medicine, some more
problematic than others. The most problematic, often dubbed, “convenience
euthanasia,” occurs when the decision seems to be made purely for the
convenience of the client owners—because they are moving and no longer have
space for the animal or because the cute puppy has grown into a not-so-cute
dog.211 Less problematic, but sometimes troubling nonetheless, are choices made
for economic reasons. “Economic euthanasia” is the term used to describe
instances where the animal has a treatable condition, but the client cannot afford
(or chooses not to spend the money on) the treatment and requests instead that
the animal be humanely euthanized.212 More justifiable reasons for euthanasia
center on the animal’s quality of life, and decisions to euthanize animals are
regularly made when animals are at the end of life, in pain, or otherwise unable
to enjoy their lives.213

See generally Hankin, supra note 13.
See infra Part III.C. for a discussion of whether these choices should be limited.
209 See A MERICAN VETERINARY MEDICAL A SS’N, P RINCIPLES OF V ETERINARY MEDICAL ETHICS OF
THE AVMA § XI (rev. Apr. 2008), available at http://www.avma.org/issues/policy/ethics.asp
(“Humane euthanasia of animals is an ethical veterinary procedure.”) [hereinafter AVMA,
PRINCIPLES]; see also Clinton R. Sanders, Killing with Kindness: Veterinary Euthanasia and the Social
Construction of Personhood, 10 SOC. F. 195 (1995).
210 See Cal. Penal Code § 599e (West 1999); see also WILSON, supra note 106, at 102 (referring
to this law as “interesting, though perhaps archaic”).
211 See Sanders, supra note 209, at 204; see also ROLLIN, supra note 192, at 62.
212 See Christopher Green, Comment, The Future of Veterinary Malpractice Liability in the Care
of Companion Animals, 10 ANIMAL L. 163, 208 (2004) (citing Daniel R. Verdon, Clients Spending
More Before Stopping Treatment, DVMs Say, DVM: THE NEWSMAGAZINE OF VETERINARY MEDICINE,
July 2003, at 1 (noting that the dollar-figure cut-off for such decisions has been rising as people
are willing to spend more and more money on their companion animals’ health care)); see also
American
Veterinary
Medical
Ass’n,
Equine
Euthanasia,
http://www.avma.org/careforanimals/animatedjourneys/goodbyefriend/ equineuth.asp (last
visited July 21, 2008) (“[I]f the financial or emotional cost of treatment [of your horse] is beyond
your means, you may need to consider euthanasia.”).
213 See Sanders, supra note 209, at 203 n.7 (“Studies indicate that the vast majority of
euthanasia decisions—from 70 to 80%—are precipitated by the animal’s age and infirmity.”).
207
208
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Unlike human medicine, where standards of care tend to be uniform,214 in
veterinary medicine, standards of care often differ by animal species, the use of
the animal, and locality.215 Veterinarians not only have to know how to treat a
number of different species (unlike medical doctors, who only treat one species),
but the animal’s species often dictates the available treatment choices.216 The use
of the animal can also affect treatment choices in a number of ways. When the
animal’s value is primarily economic, it is more likely that treatment choices will
be governed by cost of the treatment measured against the likelihood of
recovery.217 Additionally, when animals are raised to be slaughtered for food,
there may be fewer choices of drugs that can be used to treat that animal because
of the risks of those drugs ending up in the food chain.218 And while the locality
rule has lost favor in medical malpractice cases, there are good arguments that
such a rule should continue in veterinary malpractice cases, particularly in areas
where owners customarily treat or assist in treating their own animals.219
Another important difference between veterinary and human medicine is
the role of cost in veterinary treatment. While many of the treatment choices in
human medicine are also available in veterinary medicine, the comparative cost
of these treatments can be dramatically lower in veterinary medicine.220 Despite
214 See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., H EALTH LAW § 6.2(a), at 267 (2d ed. 2000) (“The
development of practice standards and guidelines by national medical organizations is
accelerating the process of moving all medical practice toward national standards.”).
215 See Nunalee & Weedon, supra note 14, at 141-42 (noting that the locality rule has
historically applied in veterinary malpractice cases, but positing that courts may be less likely to
apply this rule as information and technology becomes more available).
216 See ORLAND SOAVE, ANIMALS, THE LAW AND VETERINARY MEDICINE 15 (4th ed. 2000).
217 See id.
218 See Nunalee & Weedon, supra note 14, at 149.
219 For example, Patrick Holscher provides the following discussion:
However, given the nature of veterinary specialties and practice in the rural
West, it is at least reasonable to speculate on whether the locality rule might, or
should, apply in some instances. The standards of practice applicable to small
animals are probably justifiably relatively uniform. However, perhaps the law
might justifiably regard those that apply to large animals and livestock in
another fashion. At least arguably, the standards of practice that apply to
livestock in the rural West, where the owners still administer a great deal of
veterinary care themselves, or even assist the veterinarian, may be quite
different from those in other areas. A person familiar with livestock care in
Wyoming, for example, might be shocked by the level of veterinary care
depicted in James Herriot’s All Creatures Great and Small series. No Wyoming
cattleman could afford to call out a veterinarian for the ailments the English
farmer did.
Patrick T. Holscher, Pets and Professional Liability, WYOMING LAW., Apr. 2006, at 20. But see
WILSON, supra note 106, at 136 (suggesting that the same standards applied in medical
malpractice cases are likely to be applied in veterinary malpractice cases).
220 See Eichinger, supra note 45, at 237 (citing examples of dramatic cost difference of
comparative medical procedures such as spay surgeries in animals vs. hysterectomies in humans
($100 compared to over $15,000) and the cost of a typical five-day hospital stay for a medical
condition ($1000-1500 for veterinary hospital vs. $20,000 in a human hospital)).
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these lower costs, and despite many owners’ desire to choose the most promising
treatments, many available treatment options can be beyond the financial means
of a majority of pet owners.221 Thus the expenses themselves become a part of
treatment decisions.222 One of the ethical questions that veterinarians sometimes
find themselves faced with is whether to even tell an owner-client the full range
of options for treating an animal if the veterinarian knows that the owner cannot
afford it.223 Compounding these cost concerns is the fact that third-party
payment for pets’ health care is still relatively rare.224 Even when pet health
insurance is available, it often comes with high deductibles and incomplete
coverage.225 A 2007 Consumer Reports article concluded that most pet health
insurance policies offered little more than forced savings that rarely covered the
entire bill; the article thus advised readers that they would be better off putting
the money they would spend on premiums into an interest-bearing savings
account.226
Veterinary medical practice necessitates a sometimes challenging threeway relationship—among the treating veterinarian, the owner-client, and the
animal-patient—that is typically not present in human medical encounters. The
sometimes varying interests of the owner and the animal can lead to interesting
and often difficult questions regarding to whom the veterinarian owes a duty.227
Under veterinary licensing statutes, veterinarians owe a number of legal duties

221 See Todd W. Lue et al., Impact of the Owner-Pet and Client-Veterinarian Bond on the Care
That Pets Receive, 232 J. AM. VETERINARY ASS’N 531, 537-38 (2008) (reporting that twenty-nine
percent of pet owners surveyed had been “unable to afford veterinary services at one time or
another”).
222 See Sanders, supra note 209, at 199 (“[A]s opposed to human medicine, the cost of
potential treatments is a prime consideration in veterinary decisions with the euthanizing of the
patient as a viable final option should the client determine that the expense of treatment
outweighs the medical and emotional consequences one may reasonably expect.”).
223 Clinton Sanders, Annoying Owners: Routine Interactions with Problematic Clients in a General
Veterinary Practice, 17 QUALITATIVE SOC. 159, 162 (1994); cf. WILSON, supra note 106, at 34
(reporting that “[s]ome veterinarians have said that they regularly lie to clients who are
financially secure when it is in the best interest of the animal. These veterinarians present clients
only with the best therapeutic modality if they fear that the clients may opt for the cheapest
option despite the consequences for the animal.”).
224 See Bonnie Brewer Cavanaugh, The British Invasion, BEST’S REV., Jan. 1, 2008, at 62 (noting
that in 2006, 3% of American pets had veterinary insurance, compared to 20% of pets in the U.K.,
and 50% in Sweden). Of course, the pervasiveness of third-party payment in human medicine,
coupled with extremely high costs, leads to a different way that costs become part of treatment
decisions. A vivid reminder of this phenomenon was highlighted in Michael Moore’s film,
“Sicko.” In the early press for the film, one of the most discussed segments was the congressional
testimony of Dr. Linda Peeno, a former insurance company physician for Humana, who
“confesses” to making a decision to deny payment that cost a patient his life. See, e.g., Peter
Rainer, ‘Sicko’ Prescribes Stronger Medicine, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MON., June 29, 2007, available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0629/p15s01-almo.html.
225 See Why Pet Insurance Is Usually a Dog, C ONSUMER REP., July 2007.
226 Id.
227 See Nunalee & Weedon, supra note 14, at 128.
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to the owner-clients, such as duties of confidentiality of communications228 and,
in some jurisdictions, duties that are called informed consent.229 Other legal
duties, notably duties to report suspected cases of animal abuse under some
recent amendments to animal cruelty statutes, appear to be owed to the animal
patient.230 These tensions can be seen by comparing different sections in the code
of ethics of the veterinary profession: there is an entire section of the code
devoted to the veterinarian-client-patient relationship.231 Another section of the
code, on professional behavior, begins with a principle that places the animal
patient in the forefront: “Veterinarians should first consider the needs of the
patient: to relieve disease, suffering, or disability while minimizing pain or
fear.”232 These tensions become particularly challenging when the needs and
desires of the human client diverge from the interests of patient.233
A final difference between veterinary and human medicine is based on
differences between the natures of human and non-human animals. In making
decisions for animals, we tend to think that they differ from us in their
perception and anticipation of pain, and in their understanding of the need for
short-term pain in exchange for a healthier future.234 Other differences include
the shorter life span of many companion animals235 and how that shorter life
expectancy might affect treatment choices. Put together, all of these differences
suggest that while human medical decision-making may help to provide a
framework for making similar decisions for our animals, the lessons learned
from human medicine will need to be adjusted in a number of ways for the
different features and needs of animals. The next Part sets out a proposed
framework for making clinical decisions in veterinary medicine.

See Sarah L. Babcock & Christine Pfeiffer, Laws and Regulations Concerning the
Confidentiality of Veterinarian-Client Communication, 229 J. AM. VETERINARY MED . ASS’N 365 (2006).
229 See D. Duane Flemming & John F. Scott, The Informed Consent Doctrine: What Veterinarians
Should Tell Their Clients, 224 J. AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS’N 1436 (2004). But see infra notes 248-258
and accompanying text.
230 See, e.g., C OLO . REV. STAT. § 12-64-121(1) (West Supp. 2007) (requiring veterinarian to
report suspected animal cruelty or animal fighting).
231 See AVMA, P RINCIPLES, supra note 209, § III.
232 See id. § II.A.
233 See Nunalee & Weedon, supra note 14, at 149 (“[V]eterinarians have to deal with the
sometimes unreasonable expectations of their often irrationally emotional human clients while at
the same time keeping their animal patients’ best interests at heart. The desires of the human
client are often incongruous with the best interests of the animal patient.”).
234 See, e.g., MICHAEL P OLLAN, T HE OMNIVORE’S DILEMMA 316 (2006) (citing DANIEL C.
DENNETT, KIND OF MINDS: TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF CONSCIOUSNESS (1998)).
235 The average life expectancy of a dog is between 7 and 16 years, depending on the breed.
Cats can be expected to live 12 to 18 years. See Pet Years, Pet Life Expectancy & Vet Costs,
http://petmd.org/PetYearsLifeExpectancyVetCosts/tabid/83/Default.aspx (last visited Apr. 1,
2009).
228
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Proposed Framework For Veterinary Clinical Decision-Making

A helpful starting point to framing normative questions around animal
care decision-making is the status quo. By looking at who is currently making
such decisions, how they are made, what factors are taken into account, and how
conflict is resolved, it will be easier to see where changes need to be made and
how that might be done. It may well be that the status quo is working the
majority of the time. But, as in human medicine, the more difficult cases are often
the ones that prompt change. A proper framework for decision-making will be
one that not only works for the easy decisions, but for the most challenging ones
as well.
1.

Who should decide what level of care an animal receives?

Decision-making in veterinary care is typically divided between the
animal’s owner and the treating veterinarian. And these veterinarians and
animal owners are faced with difficult choices every day in caring for sick,
injured, and dying animals. To some extent, those choices are guided by the
legal236 and professional ethical237 obligations of the veterinarian. While the
animal owner faces fewer legal restrictions,238 her choices will be guided by a
number of factors, including emotional attachment, a sense of duty, an
understanding of the animal’s condition and the various options for treating it,
the cost of the treatment choices, and her ability to pay for it.239 Challenges may
arise when no obvious “right” choice presents itself, especially where there may
be disagreement between the animal’s owner, the treating veterinarian, and other
interested parties concerning what should be done. But perhaps even greater
challenges occur when a treating veterinarian is certain that an animal’s owner is
making the wrong choice and sees little she can do to influence the outcome.
In some respects, it appears that animal owners have almost complete
discretion in making treatment choices for their animals. Animals are still
considered the legal property of their owners (or “guardians”), and the only legal
limits, if any, on veterinary treatment choices may reside in an animal cruelty
statute’s requirement for “proper veterinary care.”240 On the other hand, owner
choices are often directed by the information they receive from veterinarians,
who have superior understanding of the animal’s condition, the available
See discussion on informed consent, infra notes 248-258 and accompanying text.
See AVMA, P RINCIPLES, supra note 209.
238 But see infra notes 312-340 and accompanying text discussing requirements in animal
cruelty laws for proper veterinary care.
239 See, e.g., Why Pet Insurance Is Usually a Dog, supra note 225 (discussing the high costs of
veterinary care).
240 E.g., DEL. CODE A NN. tit. 11, § 1325(a)(11) (2007); see also Bernard E. Rollin, Veterinary
Medical Ethics, 48 CAN. VET J. 239, 240 (2006), available at http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/
picrender.fcgi?artid=1800952&blobtype=pdf (“Ethical dilemmas in veterinary practice arise
sometimes because animals are legally defined as property. Veterinarians have no authority to
change inappropriate care by pet owners, unless it is deemed negligent or cruel.”).
236
237
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treatment options, and the likely outcome of various treatment choices.241
Veterinarians may therefore be able to manipulate owner choice by withholding
or selectively presenting this information.242 In fact, an ethical dilemma that is
sometimes cited by treating veterinarians is whether to present owners with the
full range of treatment options.243
Similar to the medical profession, however, veterinary medicine is moving
away from the traditional model of paternalism, where the doctor is the primary
decision-maker, to one involving more of a partnership between the owner and
the veterinarian. In a recent article, veterinarian Richard Lerner describes being
introduced to this “old model, one in which doctors reigned supreme” on his
first day of veterinary school.244 He rejects such “old model” thinking in his own
practice, working instead on forming a partnership with his clients.245
Veterinarians who try to control owner choices by withholding information may
also be violating their ethical and legal obligations of “informed consent.”246
While this term clearly has a different meaning in veterinary practice than it does
in human medicine, where informed consent is based on patients’ rights to make
their own decisions, it is used with surprising frequency in the veterinary
context—in articles addressed to veterinarians, in veterinary association policies,
and even in state laws regulating veterinary practice.247
The term “informed consent” is often used in veterinary medicine to
describe the legal and ethical obligations that veterinarians have to inform
animal owners about treatment options for their animals. For example, a 2007
article in the Journal of the Veterinary Medical Association, titled, “The Informed
Consent Doctrine: What Veterinarians Should Tell Their Clients” refers to a
number of states having “mandatory informed consent statutes as part of their
veterinary practice acts.”248 Such language does in fact appear in some state
regulations, such as Missouri’s Rules of Professional Conduct for Veterinarians,
which requires licensed veterinarians to “obtain the informed written consent of
the client” before performing surgery or using anesthesia on an animal, unless it
is an emergency.249 And, as recently as 2007, the AVMA formally adopted a
policy on informed consent.250
This situation is not, of course, limited to the veterinary context. Compare the discussion
in Coombes, supra note 179, at 1227 (“We say we deal with fully informed consent with our
human patients. I think a doctor does retain a certain amount of power in the therapeutic
relationship according to how much information is given and the way it is nuanced.”).
242 See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
243 See supra note 223.
244 See Richard Lerner, Mutual Aid: Understanding Your Vet’s Role and Your Own Is Key to a
Successful Partnership, BARK, May/June 2007, at 53, 54.
245 Id.
246 See, e.g., Flemming & Scott, supra note 229, at 1437.
247 Id. at 1436-37.
248 See Flemming & Scott, supra note 229, at 1436; see also Charlotte A. Lacroix, Informed
Consent—Boring
Until
You
Get
Sued,
http://www.michvma.org/documents/MVC
Proceedings/Lacroix2.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2009).
249 See Flemming & Scott, supra note 229, at 1436 (citing M O. CODE REGS. ANN. tit 20, § 2270241
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Despite its frequent use, the term “informed consent” implies a very
different set of obligations in the veterinary context than in the human medical
context. Perhaps for these reasons, there has been a recent movement away from
the use of this term in veterinary medicine, joined with arguments that mirror
the objections to the term “guardian” in the owner-animal context. Six months
after the Executive Board of the American Veterinary Medical Association
(AVMA) approved a policy on informed consent,251 the same body voted to
replace the term with “owner consent” in all of its official documents.252 In fact,
one reason cited for the change was to take away the opportunity of “animal
guardian proponents” to use any implications of the veterinary use of the term
“informed consent” in support of arguments that the veterinary association
rejects.253
The AVMA’s movement against using the term “informed consent” is
well grounded in a legal sense as well. In reality there are few actual legal
requirements regarding informed consent, as that term is understood in human
medicine.254 Legally, in the veterinary context, the obligations are derived from
the owners’ right to control their property and the fiduciary responsibilities that
veterinarians, as professionals with specialized knowledge, have to their
clients.255 While a number of statutes and regulations do in fact set out some
consent requirements, they tend to be specific to limited types of treatment, such
as surgery and anesthesia, and most of these laws do not actually require
“informed consent.”256 Some legal advice aimed at veterinarians is more openly
6.011 (2008)).
250 AVMA Adopts Policy on Informed Consent, JAVMA NEWS, May 15, 2007, available at
http://www.avma.org/onlnews/javma/may07/070515e.asp (“Informed consent better protects
the public by ensuring that veterinarians provide sufficient information in a manner so that
clients may reach appropriate decisions regarding the care of their animals. Veterinarians, to the
best of their ability, should inform the client or authorized agent, in a manner that would be
understood by a reasonable person, of the diagnostic and treatment options, risk assessment, and
prognosis, and should provide the client or authorized agent with an estimate of the charges for
veterinary services to be rendered. The client or authorized agent should indicate that the
information is understood and consent to the recommended treatment or procedure.”).
251 See id.
252 See “Informed Consent” Versus “Owner Consent”, JAVMA NEWS, Dec. 15, 2007, available at
http://www.avma.org/onlnews/javma/dec07/071215d.asp. In approving this change, the
board noted that “because the informed consent doctrine in human medicine evolved from a
cause of action for an unauthorized touching or invasion of the body, it would be wise to
preclude the use of this term in veterinary medicine and the potential legal precedents to which it
could be linked. Since animals are still property under law, guidelines from the AVMA, the
Animal Health Institute, and other veterinary legal advocates should explain this legal difference
and seek to keep it that way.” Id.
253 Id.
254 See BEAUCHAMP & C HILDRESS, supra note 154, at 79 (listing the analytical components of
informed consent as consisting of “(1) competence, (2) disclosure, (3) understanding, (4)
voluntariness, and (5) consent.”).
255 See Flemming & Scott, supra note 229, at 1436.
256 One of the examples of a “mandatory informed consent statute” in the Flemming & Scott
article is actually an Idaho licensing regulation that, at the time the article was written, in fact
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aimed at addressing liability fears, such as the aptly titled paper, “Informed
Consent—Boring Until You Get Sued.”257 The only actual authority for specific
informed consent requirements in this piece, however, is extrapolated from state
common law on physicians’ informed consent obligations to their patients.258
It is fair to say, then, that a certain lack of clarity remains around just what
is required regarding consent for veterinary treatment and exactly what the
requirements ought to be called. These uncertainties go to the heart of the
question of how the decision-making responsibility ought to be allocated
between an animal’s owner and the treating veterinarian. Ambivalence on this
question can be seen within the veterinary profession itself, as becomes clear
when comparing various sections of the AVMA’s Principles of Veterinary
Medical Ethics259 and its adopted policies. Some of the AVMA principles and
policies recognize the client’s right as a property-owner to make treatment
decisions.260 In other instances, the principles almost go in the other direction,
embracing the model of the veterinarian as the primary decision-maker by
emphasizing her professional role as the one who has the knowledge and
judgment to make the decision, with the client in the role of “agreeing to follow
the veterinarians [sic] instructions.”261 And yet other AVMA principles appear to
be motivated by concerns over potential liability.262
Unlike human medical decision-making, where patient autonomy is
paramount and informed consent is a clear legal requirement,263 veterinary
decision-making tends to be more of a negotiation between the owner and the
treating veterinarian.264 The client-owner tends to know and understand her

required the veterinarian to obtain “written consent from the patient’s owner” for surgery or
general anesthesia “where possible.” See id. (citing IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 46.01.01.152.12 (1992)).
The current version of the Idaho regulation only mentions consent (and not informed consent) in
one specific context: “Consent for Transporting. A veterinarian shall obtain written consent from
a patient's owner or other caretaker before transporting a patient to another facility for veterinary
medical care or any other reason, unless circumstances qualifying as an emergency do not permit
obtaining such consent.” IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 46.01.01.152.11 (2007).
257 See Lacroix, supra note 248.
258 See id. at 2 n.4 and accompanying text.
259 The AVMA’s Principles of Veterinary Medical Ethics has been called “the profession’s
definitive statement of its most fundamental values.” See Tannenbaum, supra note 206, at 153.
260 See, e.g., AVMA, PRINCIPLES, supra note 209, § II.E (“The decision to accept or decline
treatment and related cost should be based on adequate discussion of clinical findings, diagnostic
techniques, treatment, likely outcome, estimated cost, and reasonable assurance of payment.”).
261 See id. § III.A.1 (noting as one requisite to the establishment of a Veterinarian-ClientPatient Relationship that “[t]he veterinarian has assumed responsibility for making clinical
judgements [sic] regarding the health of the animal(s) and the need for medical treatment, and
the client has agreed to follow the veterinarians [sic] instructions.”).
262 See, e.g., id. § II.B.
263 BEAUCHAMP & C HILDRESS, supra note 154, at 77 (“Virtually all prominent medical and
research codes and institutional rules of ethics now hold that physicians and investigators must
obtain the informed consent of patients and subjects prior to any substantial intervention.”).
264 See Sanders, supra note 209, at 199.
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animal best and—one would hope—want what is best for it.265 Few animal
owners or guardians are likely to want to make treatment decisions for their
animals without the input of a veterinarian, who has superior knowledge of
treatment options and the technical ability to perform them.266 How much input
they want or need is likely to be as varied as patients’ desires in the doctorpatient context. What is clear, however, is that the best decision-making happens
when veterinarians and owner-clients work in partnership with one another,
concerned not with reducing liability of one or the other, but concerned with
doing what is best, under the circumstances, for the animal patient.267
While it is not hard to see why such a veterinarian-owner partnership
would be ideal, it is in areas of conflict where this ideal is most challenged. What
happens when an animal’s owner insists on treatment that a veterinarian
considers futile? Or, as more often happens, when an owner requests that the
veterinarian euthanize a healthy pet for reasons that appear to be based on the
owner’s convenience? To whom does the veterinarian owe a primary duty—to
the owner-client or the animal-patient?268 The veterinarian’s ethical obligations
are not easily resolved within the current system, though the law provides a
fairly straightforward answer: because animals remain the legal property of their
owners, it is the owner who has the ultimate say,269 however wrong that decision
may seem to the veterinary professional. The question that remains is whether
there should be any limits on such owner discretion; that is, are there any
circumstances under which a veterinarian can, or should be able to, legally
override the owner’s choice? In order to address that question, it is helpful to
first consider what factors are and should be included in such decisions.
2.

Factors to include in treatment decisions: toward a modified best interest
standard

The many similarities between human and veterinary medicine270 suggest
that veterinary decision-making might draw, to some extent, from human
medical decision-making for those unable to make their own decisions. Unlike
competent human patients, who can express their treatment preferences, animals
are completely dependent on others to make treatment decisions. As suggested
above, the best interest standard—which is used for those who never had
decisional capacity, and which weighs the benefits of a proposed treatment

See Sanders, supra note 223, at 160.
See id.
267 Or, as put in the sociology literature: “[T]he client calls upon his or her everyday,
intimate experience with the animal while the veterinarian primarily employs technical expertise.
Ideally, the sharing of these rather differently derived types of information leads to a cooperative
interaction and mutually satisfactory clinical outcome.” Id.
268 See also supra note 78 and accompanying text.
269 See Gary L. Francione, Animals—Property or Persons?, in A NIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT
DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 205, at 108, 116-17.
270 See infra Part III.A.
265
266
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against its burdens or risks—therefore seems to offer the best potential fit.271
Indeed, many discussions of veterinary treatment decisions sound very much
like best interest determinations.272 What may differ, however, based on
fundamental differences between humans and animals, are the factors to include
in such a risk-benefit calculus, whether to consider factors outside of the animal’s
immediate interests, and how to weigh the various factors against one another.
Both veterinarians and animal owners typically approach decisionmaking from a best interest standard. The AVMA’s Principles of Veterinary
Medical Ethics places at its forefront something that sounds very much like a best
interest standard, with primary consideration given to “the needs of the patient:
to relieve disease, suffering, or disability while minimizing pain and fear.”273 On
a more micro level, one veterinarian described the “perfect client” as one who
“cares about the welfare and well-being of the animal as much as they care about
their own need for that animal to be part of their life.”274 And certainly the
behavior of many animal owners, in seeking veterinary care and often opting for
state-of-the-art treatment choices, appears to be based on doing what is best for
the animal.275
A best interest standard thus sounds like an appealing starting point for
veterinary treatment decisions, but the factors that weigh in to the benefits-risk
calculus may be different from those for human patients. There is little question
that sentient non-human animals experience pain and pleasure,276 and thus the
pain or discomfort entailed in any treatment choice must be taken into account.
However, unlike a competent human patient or even a young child, an animal is
not able to understand that it may have to be subjected to a painful or
uncomfortable procedure “for its own good.”277 This distinction argues for
factoring such inability to understand into treatment choices278 and could weigh
in favor of opting against a treatment that could cause short-term pain even
where there is a long-term benefit. On the other hand, if an animal does not have
the ability to anticipate or dread a painful or uncomfortable procedure, and less
See supra Part II.C.
See, e.g., AAHA, Senior Care Guidelines, supra note 192, at 53 (“The veterinarian has a
responsibility to recommend what is best for the pet . . . .”); see also Veterinary Care Without the Bite,
supra note 196, at 17 (“The overriding decision should be based not on what medical treatments
are possible, but on how well-off the pet will be during and after treatment.”).
273 AVMA, P RINCIPLES, supra note 209, § II.A.
274 See Sanders, supra note 223, at 164.
275 See supra notes 189-191 and accompanying text.
276 See generally M ENTAL HEALTH AND W ELL-BEING IN ANIMALS (Franklin D. McMillan ed.,
2005).
277 See POLLAN, supra note 234, at 316 (“[L]anguage and all that comes with it can . . . make
some kinds of pain more bearable. A trip to the dentist would be an agony for an ape that couldn’t
be made to understand the purpose and duration of the procedure.”) (emphasis in original).
278 Cf. Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 432 (Mass. 1977) (ruling
that a mentally incompetent patient should not be subjected to chemotherapy, in part because the
patient could not understand the long-term goals of the regimen and would only perceive the
treatment as painful and frightening).
271
272
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ability to remember and thus relive the discomfort,279 then perhaps the decisionmaker might weigh the long-term benefit more heavily against the short-term
discomfort. While it may not be clear where this balance comes out, or how it
will be weighed differently for different animals, what is apparent is that these
differences between humans and non-human animals need to be accounted for
when choosing and weighing the various factors to apply in a best-interests test.
The short life-span of most companion animals must also be weighed into
any best interest analysis. In human medical decision-making, courts have been
much more willing to uphold choices against life-prolonging therapy when the
patient is an older adult who lacks decision-making capacity than for a young
child who does not yet have such capacity.280 This comparison suggests that the
potential benefits of a treatment include both the number of years that it can offer
as well as what capacity can be expected to develop in those years. Companion
animals, of course, will never develop the decisional capacity of an ill child who,
with proper treatment, can one day mature into a competent adult. And even a
very young animal has, in human terms, a limited number of years ahead of it.
People making treatment decisions for animals still, of course, often take their
age into account, but the much shorter life span of the animals we care for will
likely be factored into most treatment decisions.
Another, and perhaps more important, limit on using the best interest
standard for animal treatment decisions is the frequency with which what is best
for the animal bumps up against the reality of what the owner is able or willing
to pay.281 Treatment costs and the ability to pay for that treatment are much more
at the forefront of veterinary care decisions than they are in human medicine.282
Though there are certainly many instances where an insurance denial or lack of
insurance can determine what treatment a human patient receives,283 rarely does
such a blatant discussion of “how much will it cost” take place between doctors
and patients as it does between veterinarians and owners.284 Parties to this

See POLLAN, supra note 234, at 316 (distinguishing “between pain, which a great many
animals obviously experience, and suffering, which depends on a degree of self-consciousness
only a handful of animals appear to command”).
280 Compare Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 417, with pediatric cases cited supra Part II.B.
281 For a discussion of the role of cost in veterinary treatment, see supra notes 220-226 and
accompanying text.
282 See Sanders, supra note 209, at 199.
283 On third-party payment in the U.S., see Rainer, supra note 224, and Alex Berenson, 2
Lymphoma Drugs Go Unused, and Backers Cite Market Forces, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2007, at A1
(explaining that two effective drugs that combat non-Hodgkins lymphoma are too rarely used
because insurers do not pay doctors’ offices for prescribing them). Compare discussion in
Coombes, supra note 179, at 1227, where an animal owner’s ability to pay is contrasted to patientdoctor interactions because “there is no NHS [national health service] for animals.”
284 See, e.g., Sanders, supra note 223, at 166-67 (citing clients who are overly concerned with
the cost of recommended treatment as among the most problematic to veterinarians); see also
Lerner, supra note 244, at 55 (“Unless there is no shortage of money, it is impossible to make
medical decisions without putting a price tag on them.”).
279
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discussion have come to accept this reality, though they are sometimes troubled
by it.285
The reality of economic considerations driving veterinary treatment
decisions is not going to change any time soon. Third-party payment is still rare
in veterinary practice, and what pet insurance is available is of limited value.286
Even before sophisticated and expensive treatment was common in veterinary
practice, cost considerations often determined whether a pet animal was treated
or euthanized.287 The more useful question is to what extent should costs be
considered? Ethicist Jerrold Tannenbaum puts the question this way: “Is a
veterinary client morally obligated to make economic sacrifices to help a pet that
has given the family love and enjoyment over the years? If so, are there limits to
those sacrifices?”288 The AVMA Code of Ethics similarly recognizes these
concerns by allowing only the following factors to influence treatment choices:
“the needs of the patient, the welfare of the client, and the safety of the public.”289
It is fair to surmise that “the welfare of the client” includes her ability to pay for
the animal’s treatment.
Any meaningful ability to use a best interest standard in veterinary
medicine would have to include a qualification that allowed the animal’s
interests to be balanced against those of its owner, including consideration of the
owner’s ability to pay. Similar to the way parental decision-making for children
can balance the interests of the child, the parents, and the state,290 animal care
decision making must balance the interests of the animal and its owner.291 While
the opponents of “guardian” language for animals have argued that using the
best interest standard will require owners to pay for treatment they cannot
afford,292 this argument fails to take into account the legitimate balancing that
can occur between the best interests of an animal and the owner’s financial
interests. This compromise is precisely what this Article suggests for veterinary
decisions: a modified best interest standard that takes into account the many
differences between humans and non-human animals, including the increased
need to consider costs in making treatment choices.
In considering how best to balance the owner’s ability to pay with the
animal’s medical needs, there are good reasons why veterinary medical decisionSee Lerner, supra note 244, at 55.
See supra note 225.
287 See, e.g., Fredeen v. Stride, 525 P.2d 166 (Or. 1974) (holding that plaintiff, who had
requested that her sick dog be euthanized because treatment was too expensive, had a right to
recover against defendant veterinarian, who had given the dog away instead of terminating its
life).
288 Tannenbaum, supra note 206, at 145.
289 AVMA, P RINCIPLES, supra note 209, Part V.A.
290 See Rosato, supra note 122, at 11 (citing the Delaware Supreme Court’s identification of
“the tripartite balancing approach” in Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1115 (Del. 1991)).
291 While there may be no similar state interest in preserving life in the animal care context,
the state’s interest in preventing cruelty to animals, expressed through statutory animal cruelty
prohibitions, will be addressed below.
292 See AVMA Task Force, supra note 69.
285
286
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making ought not to follow the human health care model. On a societal level, we
certainly do not need to see the costs of veterinary care spiraling upward and out
of reach in the way that human health care costs have done.293 One way to
prevent such spiraling costs is to avoid importing into veterinary care a
presumption that expensive treatment options should always be chosen simply
because they are available. Similarly, at a more micro-level, the availability of an
expensive, high-tech veterinary treatment option should not mean that an animal
owner is expected to choose that option.294 Indeed, many animal owners will
choose to pay for expensive services,295 but this certainly does not mean that all
owners should be expected to do so.296 At this point, neither the veterinary
profession297 nor individual veterinarians298 seem to expect owners to pay as
much for their animal’s care as they pay for their own—in fact, most
veterinarians have accepted the reality of “economic euthanasia,” the decision to
euthanize an animal not because it is suffering and nothing more can be done,
but because the treatment options are beyond the owner’s financial means.299
And there are many reasons why this expectation of animal owner discretion on
how much to spend on their animals ought to continue.
While animal owners’ reliance on costs, alone, may not be a significant
area of conflict in veterinary treatment decisions, there are times when such
conflicts do arise. A veterinarian may, for example, believe that the owner is
relying too heavily on expenses in making treatment decisions or may otherwise
find the owner’s choice to be unreasonable.300 The next Part turns to the question
of how such conflicts should be resolved and if complete owner discretion can or
should ever be challenged.

See, e.g., Congressional Budget Office, Director’s Blog, Dec. 18, 2008,
http://cboblog.cbo.gov/?p=193 (“The rising costs of health care and health insurance pose a
serious threat to the future fiscal condition of the United States.”).
294 See, e.g., People v. Arroyo, 777 N.Y.S.2d 836, 844 (2004) (citing the owner’s ability to pay
the cost of veterinary treatment as one justification for the court’s refusal to find, in a state animal
cruelty statute, a duty to provide veterinary care, reasoning that “[r]eading into A.M.L. § 353 an
affirmative duty to provide medical care in all cases, regardless of the expenses or the owner’s
ability to meet them, implies a standard of morality and decency that the court is not persuaded
society has adopted”).
295 See Lue et al., supra note 221, at 540 (“Only 2 in 10 clients said they were apt to decline
care because they could not afford it.”).
296 Cf. David Favre, How Much “Care” Does the Law Require?, in TAMIE L. BRYANT, REBECCA J.
HUSS & DAVID N. CASSUTO, ANIMAL LAW AND THE COURTS: A READER 162 (2008) (“[I]t is not
appropriate to have a legal system that requires a human to provide an animal with more
medical care than that human can provide for him or herself.”).
297 See supra note 289 and accompanying text, discussing the recognition of “the welfare of
the client” in the AVMA Code of Ethics.
298 See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
299 See Sanders, supra note 222, at 199 (discussing euthanasia as a “viable final option” as
weighed against the cost of expensive treatment); see also Green, supra note 212, at 208.
300 See Sanders, supra note 265, at 161-67.
293
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3.

Resolving Conflict: Should There Be Any Limits On Owner Choice?

The first Part of this Article argued that animal law statutes that replace
“owner” with “guardian” will not, as opponents have claimed, limit in any way
the health care choices that we can make for our animals.301 While ownerguardian language may help pet owners better understand their responsibilities
toward their animals and perhaps in this way may ultimately influence the
choices they make, the language change has no legal effect and no enforcement
role.302 What remains unanswered is the question of whether there should be any
legally enforceable limits on veterinary care decisions, and if so, how the law can
best effect these limits. Some choices that animal owners make can be truly
egregious, and it is not hard to see why we might want to limit these behaviors.
Given that we already limit certain behaviors toward animals through animal
cruelty laws, perhaps these statutes could be used to enforce some limits on
veterinary care choices.
Legally, animal owners have almost complete discretion in making
choices for their animal’s health care, and in most cases, this presumption in
favor of owners is warranted. The deference to animal owners in making
treatment decisions is typically much stronger than the deference given to
parents when they make treatment decisions for their children.303 The
assumption that parents will act in the best interests of children is typically only
overcome in extreme cases, such as the rejection of life-saving treatment.304
Animal care generally starts with a similar presumption—that the owners will
act in the animal’s best interest, though the animal’s interest can more often be
overridden by interests of the owner. But, perhaps like the presumption in favor
of parents’ discretion, this presumption might also be overridden in extreme
cases, with a higher bar on what constitutes “extreme.” Given all of the
differences between animal and human health care, it may not be appropriate to
question an owner for opting against life-saving treatment, even when that
choice is driven by financial concerns. Still, it may be justifiable to limit some
owner choices, and a likely starting place to impose such limits is the decision to
euthanize a healthy animal for the owner’s convenience.305
See supra Part I; see also Rollin, supra note 240 (“Ethical dilemmas in veterinary practice
arise sometimes because animals are legally defined as property. Veterinarians have no authority
to change inappropriate care by pet owners, unless it is deemed negligent or cruel. If animal
ownership is redefined as animal guardianship, this could change. Veterinarians would then
have greater authority/responsibility to insist on appropriate care for injured or ailing pets. Will
changing the legal definition of animal owner to animal guardian reduce or increase the number
of ethical conflicts that occur in companion animal practice?”).
302 See supra notes 80-87.
303 Compare Sanders, supra note 209, at 204, and ROLLIN, supra note 192, at 62 (convenience
euthanasia), with BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1144 (8th ed. 2004) (parens patriae power of the state).
304 See B EAUCHAMP & C HILDRESS, supra note 154, at 179.
305 See Annamaria Passantino et al., Euthanasia of Companion Animals: A Legal and Ethical
Analysis,
42
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Even though humane euthanasia is an accepted and ethical treatment
option in veterinary medicine,306 not all decisions to euthanize are acceptable or
ethical. The veterinary professionals who perform these procedures on animals
tend to judge owners’ requests for euthanizing animals on a continuum of
legitimacy.307 The majority of euthanasia decisions are made for reasons that are
considered the most legitimate: to relieve pain or infirmity caused by illness or
injury.308 Further down the scale, but still acceptable to most veterinarians, are
decisions that focus on owner interests—financial interests as well as interests in
not making the effort to remedy animal behavior problems, given the limited
time, energy, and knowledge that may be available to a particular owner.309 The
least justifiable reason, troubling to the veterinarians who are asked to perform it
as well as most others who hear about it, is what has been called “convenience
euthanasia.”310 And while current laws put few if any limits on such choices,311
perhaps this is where intervention should occur.
Laws against animal cruelty provide the best basis for challenging such
owner treatment choices. These laws already provide the place where we, as a
society, have determined that certain behavior towards animals—whether
framed as protecting the animal’s interests312 or protecting society’s interest in
the way it treats its animals—will not be tolerated.313 It therefore makes sense to
look here, and not to laws that simply change “owner” terminology to
“guardian” as a place to challenge the complete discretion that owners of
companion animals have had to decide when their animals will live or die.
The appropriateness of using animal cruelty laws to challenge owner
treatment decisions is based on important differences between animal and
human health care. In the context of parents making health care decisions for
policymakers should “limit the vast discretion” that owners of companion animals currently
have to euthanize their animals.).
306 See supra Part III.B.
307 Sanders, supra note 209, at 203.
308 Id.
309 See id.; see also American Veterinary Medical Ass’n, supra note 212 (approving of equine
euthanasia in financial hardship cases).
310 See infra note 335.
311 See Hankin, supra note 13, at 406 n.393 (citing ROLLIN, supra note 192, at 33, 59, 62-63).
While courts have found ways to invalidate requests to euthanize healthy animals as “against
public policy” when they come in the form of testamentary provisions, current law rarely
interferes with such choices by living owners. See id. at 353-58.
312 These interests have even been characterized as animal rights. See Cass Sunstein,
Introduction: What Are Animal Rights?, in ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT D EBATES AND NEW
DIRECTIONS, supra note 205, at 3, 5-6 (describing animal cruelty statutes as supporting a
“minimalist” animal rights position, where “rights” entail legal protection against harm, because
the coverage and application of state laws are quite narrow).
313 Animal cruelty statutes have undergone a significant transformation in the past decade,
increasing penalties, broadening the range of included offenses, and imposing additional
affirmative duties to care for animals. See Hankin, supra note 13, at 365-68 and accompanying
notes; see also Sunstein, Can Animals Sue?, in ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW
DIRECTIONS, supra note 205, at 251, 252.
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their children, there has been some well-founded criticism of using child abuse
and neglect statutes as a mechanism for challenging those decisions.314 Decisions
owners make for their companion animals are different enough, however, that
those objections do not apply in this context. Health care decision-making for
children involves a balancing of various rights, interests, and duties: the best
interests of the child, the right of parents to make decisions about their child’s
health care, state interests in preserving life, and state parens patriae duties to
protect children from harm.315 These interests are often aligned; when they are
not, challenging parental decision-making through abuse and neglect laws is
often not the best way to achieve the proper balance. In the animal care context,
however- where clinical interactions of a “triangular nature” involve
veterinarians, human clients, and animal patients316 - cruelty or abuse laws
provide precisely the right way to strike the proper balance in challenging owner
discretion in animal care decision-making.
The interests and duties involved in making animal care decisions are
very different from those in the parent-child context. Animals may have some
moral and legal interests,316 but those interests cannot be compared to those of a
child. Where parents and children are both human beings with similar legal
rights, the same cannot be said of animals and owners.317 The primary interest
recognized by law is that of the owner to control what is in most cases
considered property.318 And unlike with children, there is no analogous state
interest in preserving the life of animals and no parens patriae duties to protect
them from harm. We have, however, recognized societal interests in protecting at
least some animals from some harm, as well as interests that these animals have
in being protected from harm.319 The very place where society’s and animals’
interests coalesce is in statutes that exist in every state prohibiting animal cruelty,
abuse, and neglect. Animal treatment decisions might also implicate interests of
individual veterinarians and of the veterinary profession.320 Those interests can
also be protected through use of animal cruelty statutes.321
See Wadlington, supra note 120, at 336 (questioning “whether child abuse reporting
statutes, at present one of the few formal measures for channeling medically deprived children
into the health-care system, are the appropriate approach either in terms of effectiveness or
timing.”); see also Rosato, supra note 122, at 26 (“Medical neglect is simply an inappropriate
paradigm for determining decision-making authority.”).
315 See supra Part II.B.
316 See Tannenbaum, supra note 206, at 144-45 (discussing and weighing conflicts between
human and animal interests).
317 See id. at 147 (noting that “[h]uman medical ethics begins with the principle that . . . all
medical patients are, in some sense, of equal value” and contrasting the position in veterinary
medical ethics, where there can be substantial disagreement about the value of a veterinarian’s
patients”).
318 See supra note 200.
319 See GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, P ROPERTY , AND THE LAW 119-133 (1995) (discussing the
purposes of animal cruelty statutes).
320 Veterinarians have a strong interest in limits on convenience euthanasia. See ROLLIN,
supra note 192, at 62 (describing the request to kill healthy animals as “the most demoralizing part
314
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Using animal cruelty statutes as a vehicle to challenge owner discretion in
veterinary decision-making provides the best way to challenge these sometimes
competing interests while at the same time giving guidance as to which decisions
are subject to challenge: those that fit within the rubric of abuse or neglect.
Unlike the parent-child decision-making context, where use of abuse and neglect
statutes to challenge parental decision-making has been appropriately criticized,
the reasons for such criticisms are not applicable in the animal context—another
difference between owner-animal and parent-child decision-making. As one
commentator has aptly noted, most challenges to parental authority in denial-oftreatment cases do not properly fall within the spirit, even if they are within the
technical language, of abuse and neglect statutes.322 Parents who are challenged
on whether they possess the moral authority to refuse treatment on their child’s
behalf are usually acting in good faith, even if misguided; they are typically
trying to do what they believe is best for the child while “adher[ing] to the
dictates of the parent’s or child’s religion.”323 Such parents are not, however,
abusive or neglectful in the way we typically understand that term.324 In contrast,
under the framework set out above, the choices of animal owners would only be
challenged under animal abuse and neglect statutes in the extreme case where
they request that their healthy companion animal be euthanized—a situation that
falls squarely within the spirit of abuse and neglect statutes. And while such
decisions may not yet be within the letter of most current animal cruelty laws,
they do fall within some current laws; other statutes could and should be revised
to include euthanizing a healthy animal as a form of abuse.
Animal cruelty laws could be used to limit owner treatment choices by
including, strengthening, and clarifying provisions that require proper
veterinary care.325 Currently, few of the cruelty statutes even address veterinary

of companion animal practice”). The interests of the veterinary profession are harder to
document. In a 26-page report, the AVMA Guidelines on Euthanasia, the authors recognized, but
declined to address, the ethical concerns around euthanizing healthy animals. See AVMA
GUIDELINES ON EUTHANASIA 3-4 (2007), available at http://www.avma.org/issues/animal_
welfare/euthanasia.pdf. In contrast, the Association of Veterinarians for Animal Rights (AVAR)
has taken a clear position on the issue: “[V]eterinarians should refuse on principle to be the
instrument of death of nonhuman animals for reasons other than those of mercy, the situation in
animal control facilities being a notable exception.” See Association of Veterinarians for Animal
Rights,
Position
Statement:
Euthanasia
of
Nonhuman
Animals,
http://avar.org/publications_position.asp#p14 (rev. June 1997).
321 See infra notes 322-340 and accompanying text.
322 See Rosato, supra note 122, at 26-27.
323 See id.
324 See id. (“This image [of the parent acting in good faith] stands in contrast to the
prototypical ‘neglectful’ parent, whose omissions violate the social consensus of good parenting
and thus warrant state intervention under the traditional neglect statutes.”).
325 See Phyllis Coleman, Man[’s Best Friend] Does not Live by Bread Alone: Imposing a Duty to
Provide Veterinary Care, 12 ANIMAL L. 7 (2005) (proposing “uniform legislation that creates an
explicit obligation to provide health care to companion animals, imposes a duty on veterinarians
to report cruelty, and establishes strict penalties for violations”).
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care326 and many of those that do specifically exempt owner choices for humane
euthanasia. For example, Nebraska’s statute on offenses against animals requires
animal caretakers to provide “care as is reasonably necessary for the animal’s
health,” but specifically allows “humane killing . . . upon the owner’s request.”327
Recent amendments to Michigan’s statute on crimes against animals require that
animals receive “adequate care” which includes “veterinary medical attention in
order to maintain an animal in a state of good health.”328 Unlike Nebraska’s law,
Michigan does not contain an exemption for owner-requested euthanasia; it does
prohibit abandoning animals without providing adequate care, but it is unclear if
the statute could be used to prevent the euthanizing of a healthy animal.
At least one statute does contain language that could support an argument
that convenience euthanasia violates anti-cruelty law. Delaware, like other states,
requires animal owners to provide “proper veterinary care.”329 But, unlike in
other states, a person in Delaware is guilty of cruelty when he “unnecessarily
kills . . . any animal whether belonging to [him] or another.”330 The statute
expands on “unnecessarily” to include killing “if the act is not required to
terminate an animal’s suffering, to protect the life or property of the actor or
another person or if other means of disposing of an animal exist which would
not impair the health or well being of that animal.”331 This language appears to
contain a clear prohibition of killing a healthy animal merely for the owner’s
convenience (“not required to terminate … suffering”)332 while allowing the
flexibility to make such choices to prevent a true financial hardship (“to protect
… property”). The final clause, despite the unfortunate choice of the term
“disposing,” can be read as encouraging owners to find other homes for their
unwanted animals or at least to take them to a shelter that will provide better
care for them.333 The statute also contains an exception for scientific research and
See id.
See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-1008(1), 28-1013(6) (1995); see also ALA . CODE § 13A-11-246(2)
(LexisNexis 2005) (exempting from its cruelty laws “any owner of a dog or cat who euthanizes
the dog of cat for humane purposes”). Although an argument might be made that euthanizing an
animal for the owner’s convenience does not constitute “humane purposes,” this argument is not
likely to gain much traction when a provision in the same section of the statute allows people to
shoot dogs or cats with a BB gun if they catch the animals urinating on their property, provided
that the gun is “not capable of inflicting serious injury.” See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-246(4)
(LexisNexis 2005).
328 MICH. C OMP . LAWS A NN. § 750.50(1)(a), (2)(a) (Supp. 2008).
329 DEL. C ODE A NN. tit. 11, § 1325(a)(11) (2007).
330 DEL. CODE A NN. tit. 11, § 1325(b)(4) (2007). Note, however, that the provision exempts the
killing of food animals from this prohibition on unnecessary killing, so long as it is done
humanely.
331 Id.
332 Cf. Passantino et al., supra note 305, at 493 (citing a law in Italy’s Abruzzo Region that
explicitly decrees that “putting down animals should be done only on the owner’s request for
valid health reasons” and allows for an owner to give her animal to a kennel if maintenance of
the animal has become impossible).
333 Cf. Coleman, supra note 325, at 35 (giving a proposed animal cruelty law containing the
warning that “[g]uardians who do not want to pay for needed treatment can only protect
326
327
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“accepted veterinary practices.”334 While at first this exception may appear to
sanction the killing of a healthy animal at the owner’s request, it more likely
allows for input from the veterinary profession—and even for evolving
standards—as to what is deemed acceptable. If most veterinarians truly object to
performing convenience euthanasia, as has been reported,335 then the procedure
cannot easily be characterized as an “accepted veterinary practice.” If nothing
else, such language could certainly support a veterinarian’s objections to, or
refusal to comply with, an owner’s request to euthanize a healthy animal.336
One argument against this interpretation is that it raises the specter of
what happens to unwanted animals. Some veterinarians reluctantly acquiesce to
owner-requested euthanasia of a healthy animal because they cannot take on
caring for the animals that the owner no longer wants and they do not want to be
responsible for what may happen to these unwanted animals.337 Here, again,
animal cruelty statutes’ penalty provisions provide some useful guidance. In
Delaware, for example, violators of the cruelty prohibitions, including that
against unnecessary killing, are prohibited from owning or possessing an animal
for five or fifteen years, depending on whether the crime is a felony or a
misdemeanor.338 A number of other cruelty statutes states allow courts to require
the forfeiture of abused animals or, similarly, to remove animals from owners
who abuse them.339 Animals that are removed from abusive owners can be rehomed through shelters or animal rescue groups.340 Thus, denying an owner the
themselves from legal responsibility for failure to do so if they find someone who adopts the
companion animal or a no-kill shelter that will take the companion animal.”).
334 DEL. C ODE A NN. tit. 11, § 1325(b) (2007).
335 See Sanders, supra note 209, at 204 (describing veterinarians’ views of clients who request
euthanasia “for the simple convenience of the owner” as “morally suspect”); Tannenbaum, supra
note 206, at 145 (“[A]n increasing proportion of veterinarians view . . . ‘convenience euthanasia’
as unethical”).
336 See Sanders, supra note 209, at 204-05 (recounting instances of veterinarians who refuse
such requests or attempt to persuade the owner away from the decision to euthanize).
337 For similar reasons, veterinary groups have paradoxically opposed federal laws banning
horse slaughter, on the grounds that slaughtering unwanted horses may be a more humane
option than the abuse or neglect they might otherwise face. See Hankin, supra note 13, at 356
n.196.
338 See DEL. CODE A NN. tit. 11, § 1325(c), (d) (2007). Felony crimes include intentional killing
in violation of the section prohibiting killing “unnecessarily.” See also ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.140(f)
(2006) (authorizing the court to prohibit persons convicted of animal cruelty from owning or
possessing animals for up to ten years).
339 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.140(f) (2006). This law also specifies that the court may
require defendants to reimburse “the state or a custodian for all reasonable costs incurred in
providing necessary shelter, care, veterinary attention, or medical treatment for any animal
affected.”
340 Indeed, Discovery Channel’s Animal Planet has an entire series of television shows
documenting the removal, shelter care, and subsequent adoption of abused and neglected
animals in various cities: Animal Precinct (New York), Animal Cops (Houston), Miami Animal
Police,
and
Animal
Planet
Heroes:
Phoenix.
See
Animal
Planet
Fansite,
http://animal.discovery.com/fansites/animalprecinct/animalprecinct.html (last visited Feb. 7,
2009).
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choice to euthanize a healthy animal and then finding another home for the
animal is essentially another way of confiscating an animal to protect it from
what can be characterized as a form of abuse: viewing that animal as disposable
property and treating it accordingly.
The Delaware statute could serve as a model of how to use cruelty laws to
challenge the truly egregious owner choice of euthanizing a healthy animal. The
statute’s language contains enough leeway to allow owner interests, even
financial ones, to trump the animal’s interest, while discouraging the killing of a
healthy animal when other options exist for the animal. It allows for
veterinarians to challenge owner choices that go against accepted practices, and
it contains provisions to protect animals from being owned by people who
would treat them in this way. Prohibiting egregious behavior through cruelty
statutes requires a careful balance: leaving room for other options where
euthanasia choices or decisions not to treat are more of a judgment call or are
based on an inability to pay for treatment. In these cases that involve more of a
“gray area,” it would be better for all concerned to work to remove economic
barriers and otherwise to help owners treat and keep their animals.

Conclusion
State and local laws that change the designation from pet “owner” to
“guardian” will not, as opponents have argued, affect in any way our ability to
make veterinary care choices for our companion animals. Behind these
arguments against guardian language is the premise that no one should interfere
with an owner’s authority to make decisions for her animal’s health care. This
debate raises questions about whether such ultimate discretion on an owner’s
part should ever go unchecked. In most cases of veterinary care decision-making,
the status quo—where owners and veterinarians work in partnership to make
decisions that balance the animal’s interest with that of the owner—is working
fine and does not need to be changed. The primary exceptions, where more
limits on owner discretion are needed, are in cases of “convenience euthanasia:”
companion animal owners who request that their veterinarians euthanize
healthy animals simply because it is no longer convenient to keep them.341 The
best way to challenge and limit such choices is not through owner/guardian
language changes, which have no legal effect, but rather by strengthening animal
cruelty laws. These state statutes should all include language requiring proper
veterinary care; if necessary, such language should be modified to make it clear
that requesting the euthanasia of a healthy companion animal solely for the
owner’s convenience is a form of animal abuse and is therefore prohibited.

341

See ROLLIN, supra note 192, at 62.

51

